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REINTERPRETING THE
REINTERPRETATION: COLLECTIVE
SELF-DEFENSE AS CONSTITUTIONAL
FIDELITY
C. D. A. Evans 1& Aviel Menter 2
ABSTRACT
As currently interpreted, Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution requires Japan’s Self-Defense
Forces (JSDF) to operate in a purely defensive capacity. Recently, however, the United States
has increasingly asked Japan to participate in joint military operations, in which Japanese forces
would defend not only themselves, but also their American allies. This raises an important legal
question: does Article 9 permit the JSDF engage in this kind of collective self-defense?
Former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo believed so. After a government panel of legal experts
found that collective self-defense was consistent with Article 9, the Abe administration adopted
the panel’s conclusion. However, this “Reinterpretation” of Article 9 has been highly
controversial. Japanese scholars of constitutional law are deeply divided on the meaning of
Article 9 and the legality of the Reinterpretation. While some maintain that Article 9 prohibits
collective self-defense, others have argued that Article 9 either permits it, or is superseded by
Japan’s treaty obligations to the United States.
However, until now, these arguments have not been reflected in the non-Japanese literature.
Accordingly, English-language scholarship has often assumed with little discussion that the
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Reinterpretation is inconsistent with Article 9, before proceeding to analyze the Reinterpretation
as a failed attempt to informally amend the Article 9 without the requisite democratic support.
This essay re-frames the debate. The Reinterpretation is not an attempt to amend Article 9, but
an attempt to understand it. Accordingly, its legitimacy is not derived from the magnitude of its
popular support, but the strength of its legal justifications.
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INTRODUCTION
After unconditional surrender in World War II, Japan was
occupied by a foreign power for the first time in her recorded
history. 3 As a condition of the Instrument of Unconditional
Surrender, Japan disarmed its military and adopted an amended
Constitution that, in its ninth article, prohibited the maintenance of
“land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential.” 4
Despite this commitment, Japan has long maintained armed
forces. 5 In 1950, while Japan was still under American occupation,
Army General Headquarters (GHQ) instructed leaders of the
fledgling Japanese Diet to create a National Police Reserve (NPR) of
75,000 persons, so that the United States could redeploy her own
ground forces to fight in the Korean War. 6 Over time, the NPR
evolved into Japan’s current armed forces, the JSDF (Japan SelfDefense Forces). 7 Although the occupation of Japan ended in 1952,
Japanese legal commitments made during the occupation were
incorporated into the Treaty of San Francisco, the instrument
through which Japan regained full sovereignty. 8 Subsequently,
See generally MARIUS B. JANSEN, THE MAKING OF MODERN JAPAN (2002).
NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ], art. 9, para. 2, translated in The Constitution
of Japan, PRIME MINISTER OF JAPAN AND HIS CABINET, http://japan.kantei.go.jp
/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html (last visited Feb. 16,
2020).
5 See Takei Tomohisa, Japan Maritime Self Defense Force in the New Maritime
Era, 34 HATOU 4 (2008) (“Japan’s naval build up began after the Meiji Restoration
in 1868 . . . [F]leet battle doctrine . . . continued until the dismantlement of Imperial
Navy in 1945 . . . At the onset of the Cold War, once the East-West
confrontational posture had been clearly delineated, the JMSDF formally emerged
from its predecessor of two years, the Coastal Safety Force or Kaijo Keibitai.”)
6
MASUDA HIROSHI, MACARTHUR IN ASIA: THE GENERAL AND HIS STAFF
IN THE PHILIPPINES, JAPAN, AND KOREA 253 (2012).
7 See Ayako Kusunoki, The Early Years of the Ground Self-Defense Forces, 1945–
1960 in THE JAPANESE GROUND SELF-DEFENSE FORCE: SEARCH FOR LEGITIMACY
8 (Eldrige & Midford, eds. (2017) (providing a chronology of the SDF); id. at 60–62
(describing the evolution of the SDF from the NPR).
8
Yoshida Shigeru, Prime Minister of Japan, Speech on Signing Treaty of
San Francisco (Sept. 7, 1951); see also STEVEN GOW CALABRESI ET AL., THE U. S.
CONSTITUTION AND COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: TEXTS, CASES AND
MATERIALS (forthcoming 2021).
3
4
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military cooperation has remained a core element of Japanese defense
policy. 9 Recent developments, including the rise of military
assertiveness in China and North Korea, have placed more emphasis
on joint Japanese-American military operations. 10 On December
26th, 2019, Japan even agreed, for the first time, to dispatch
independent naval forces to the Middle East. 11 These new
deployments raise key questions about the legal status of the JSDF. 12
Should Japanese force deployments be treated as military
expeditions? If so, do they violate Article 9 of Japan’s Constitution? 13
Japanese judges and constitutional scholars have long
struggled to reconcile the Post-War Constitution’s prima facie
commitment to disarmament with the continued maintenance of
armed forces. 14 Some scholars have argued that the prohibition in
paragraph 2 of Article 9 is less all-encompassing than it appears,
limited by the Article’s preamble to the use of military force “as a
means of settling international disputes.” 15 Others have argued that
the Treaty of San Francisco overrides the limitations of the Post-War
Constitution, requiring the continued maintenance of military forces,
as well as continued military cooperation with the United States. 16

9
Nobukatsu Kanehara, Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet, Office of the
Prime Minister of Japan, Speech on Japan’s Grand Strategy and Universal Values at
Columbia University (Apr. 11, 2017).
10
Shinsuke J. Sugiyama, Ambassador of Japan to the United States,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Speech on Japan’s Strategy for the 21st
Century at Columbia University (Nov. 16, 2018).
11
Kiyoshi Takenaka, Japan to Send Warship, Aircraft to Middle East to Protect
Vessels, REUTERS (Dec. 26, 2019, 7:24 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/usmideast-iran-japan/japan-to-send-warship-aircraft-to-middle-east-to-protectvessels-idUSKBN1YV00W.
12
Interview in person with Mizobuchi Masashi, Minister-Counsellor at the
Embassy of Japan, D.C. (Jan. 17, 2021).
13 Id.
14 See, e.g., Itazuke Air Force Base Dispute (Japan v. Matsumoto et. al.), Tokyo
High Court 9–11 (Mar. 5, 1960) (translation on file with author).
15
NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ], art. 9, para. 1 (Japan).
16 See Treaty of Peace with Japan art. 19, Sept. 8, 1951, 3. U.S.T. 3169, 136
U.N.T.S. 45.
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Japan’s Supreme Court addressed this problem to some
extent in the 1950s, holding in Sakata v. Japan 17 that Article 9 permits
the maintenance of self-defense forces, at least so long as those
forces lack the strength to wage a war of aggression. Yet recent
developments have created renewed tension between the
requirements of Article 9 and Japan’s self-defense needs. 18 As the
United States increasingly requests Japanese participation in joint
military activities, 19 the JSDF has been ordered to conduct operations
that do not fall cleanly into a narrow definition of self-defense. These
developments test the limits of the Court’s holding in Sakata, and
accordingly the limits of Article 9 as well.
To resolve this tension, the Japanese government under
Prime Minister Abe Shinzo made a series of administrative and
legislative moves intended to clarify the scope of permissible military
activity, as well as the status of Japan’s military forces. Originally, the
Abe administration proposed a constitutional amendment to Article
9. 20 However, after the proposed amendments failed to generate a
broad parliamentary majority, the administration, working through
the Cabinet, commissioned and then adopted by resolution and
legislation a “reinterpretation” of Article 9, interpreting it to permit
Japanese forces to engage in collective self-defense. 21

Sakata v. Japan, 13 Keishu 3225 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Dec. 16, 1959).
Steve Herman, Japan Mulls Constitutional Reform, VOICE OF AMERICA
(Feb. 15, 2006, 9:27 AM), https://www.voanews.com/archive/japan-mullsconstitutional-reform.
19 Trump Expects Japan’s Military to Reinforce United States in Asia and Beyond,
REUTERS (May 27, 2019, 8:30 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-japanusa/trump-expects-japans-military-to-reinforce-united-states-in-asia-and-beyondidUSKCN1SY06Y.
20 See generally NIHON-KOKU KENPOU KAISEI SOUAN, POLICY PLATFORM
OF THE LDP (2012), available at http://www.jimin.jp/policy/policy_topics/pdf/
seisaku-109.pdf (Japanese language).
21
THE ADVISORY PANEL ON CONSTRUCTION OF THE LEGAL BASIS FOR
SECURITY, REPORT OF THE ADVISORY PANEL ON RECONSTRUCTION OF THE
LEGAL BASIS FOR SECURITY (2014), http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/
anzenhosyou2/dai7/houkoku_en.pdf [hereinafter REPORT OF THE ADVISORY
PANEL].
17
18
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This Reinterpretation quickly set off a heated legal debate in
Japan. 22 Although many Japanese contend that Article 9 prohibits
Japanese forces from engaging in collective self-defense, 23 others
have read the Article differently, 24 or argued that Japan’s international
obligations supersede this domestic constitutional requirement. 25
Outside of Japan, however, this legal debate has received
relatively little attention. International constitutional analysis of the
Reinterpretation has often assumed that the Abe administration’s
understanding of Article 9 is legally unfounded. 26 Instead, it has
treated the Reinterpretation as an attempt to amend the Japanese
constitution without going through the formal amendment process. 27
This scholarship has generally applied Professor Bruce Ackerman’s
five-step model 28 for informal constitutional change. This model
views constitutional change as arising out of a groundswell of
national popular support, rather than a formal legal process.
Accordingly, scholars applying Ackerman’s model have usually
concluded that the Reinterpretation lacks the requisite popular
approval to legitimize any attempt at informal constitutional
amendment. 29

Justin McCurry, Japanese Pacifists Unnerved by Lifting of Ban on Military
Intervention, THE GUARDIAN (July 1, 2014, 9:01 AM) (quoting Takeshi Ishida,
Professor Emeritus at Tokyo University).
23 See, e.g., James E. Auer, Article Nine of Japan’s Constitution: From Renunciation
of Armed Force ‘Forever’ to the Third Largest Defense Budget in the World, 53 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 171, 183 (1990).
24 See REPORT OF THE ADVISORY PANEL, supra note 21.
25
Narushige Michishita, Vice-President, Nat’l Graduate Inst. for Pol’y
Studies, Lecture at the Bos. Univ. Ctr. for the Study of Asia: The Rise of China and
Japan’s Response (Sept. 25, 2019).
26 See, e.g., Rosalind Dixon & Guy Baldwin, Globalizing Constitutional
Moments? A Reflection on the Japanese Article 9 Debate, 67 AM. J. COMP. L. 145, 159–61
(2019).
27 See, e.g., Craig Martin, The Legitimacy of Informal Constitutional Amendment
and the “Reinterpretation” of Japan’s War Powers, 40 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 427, 508–11
(2017).
28 See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991).
29 See, e.g., Dixon & Baldwin, supra note 26, at 163–72; Martin, supra note
27, at 502–06.
22
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This Essay, however, argues that the Reinterpretation should
not be understood as an informal constitutional amendment, because
it isn’t trying to amend the Constitution in the first instance.
International analysis of the Reinterpretation often takes as a premise
the primary issue in dispute: whether the Reinterpretation is based on
a legally justifiable understanding of the Post-War Constitution. If it
is, as many Japanese scholars contend, 30 then the Reinterpretation is
not an attempted circumvention of the Constitution’s amendment
process. It is instead an honest effort to resolve a genuine legal
problem—specifically, the apparent contradiction between Article 9’s
prohibition on military activity and Japan’s treaty obligation to
maintain defense forces. Like any other interpretation of a
constitutional provision, the Reinterpretation should therefore be
judged according to its legal merits, not its popularity.
Part I of this Essay explains the historical developments that
led to Japan’s current legal predicament. It discusses Japan’s initial
adoption of Article 9 as part of the post-war Constitution, followed
by the creation of defense forces pursuant to GHQ’s guidance after
the outbreak of the Korean War. Part I then recounts some of
Japan’s earlier failed attempts to amend Article 9 prior to the
Reinterpretation, demonstrating that the uncertain constitutional
status of the JSDF has posed legal problems since long before the
Abe administration.
Part II of this Essay lays out the legal basis for the
Reinterpretation, discussing the differing legal stances that scholars
have taken with respect to Article 9 and the Treaty of San Francisco.
Although the Reinterpretation is inconsistent with some of these
legal understandings, it is potentially compatible with others. In
particular, the Reinterpretation can be justified by a reading of Article
30
See, for example, extended discussions of varying views offered in
NAKAJIMA TORU, CASEBOOK ON JAPANESE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2010)
(Japanese language). Japanese scholars generally adopt a positivist approach to
Constitutional reconstruction, as the Japanese legal tradition is somewhat removed
from natural law influences more common in the European tradition. Cf. C. D. A.
Evans, Suarez: Law and Obligation, PHIL. F. (Sept. 2, 2011). But even from a natural
law perspective, all that is needed for our argument is that the issue is complex and
the answer genuinely a subject of dispute.
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9 that permits collective self-defense, or by an understanding that
treats Japan’s obligations under the Treaty of San Francisco as
supreme over domestic Japanese law, including Japanese
constitutional law.
Finally, Part III of this Essay responds to international
constitutional scholarship analyzing the Reinterpretation as an
attempt to informally amend the Japanese Constitution. It argues that
the requirements of Article 9 have not been sufficiently established,
either as a matter of original meaning or by any authoritative body,
for the Reinterpretation to “amend” the Article. Instead, the
Reinterpretation is better understood as a genuine legal position on
the meaning of the Constitution, motivated by a desire to reconcile
Japan’s domestic and international obligations.
Constitutions cannot be written with the “prolixity of a legal
code.” 31 Their terms are often broad, subject to future exposition and
clarification. 32 It can be tempting to accuse constitutional actors of
politically motivated revisionism when disagreement arises over the
interpretation of a constitutional provision. But unless these actors
are openly or demonstrably operating in bad faith, such accusations
diminish the scope of liberal discourse. Multiple interpretations of a
constitutional provision are often reasonable—and if one
interpretation is correct, then it is correct regardless of its political
implications.
I. THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN
Following the terms of the Potsdam Declaration, the United
States led an occupying force that took political control over Japan in
1945. 33 General Headquarters (GHQ) set up shop in Tokyo, 34 with a
mandate to prevent Japan from returning to the fascist politics that
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
This is certainly true of Japan’s Constitution. See J. Mark Ramseyer, 17 J.
JAPANESE STUD. 176, 176–78 (1991) (reviewing HIROSHI ITOH, THE JAPANESE
SUPREME COURT: CONSTITUTIONAL POLICIES (1990)).
33 See JOHN W. DOWER, EMBRACING DEFEAT: JAPAN IN THE WAKE OF
WORLD WAR II 39–80 (1999).
34 Id. at 45–48.
31
32
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had caused immense global suffering from 1931 to 1945. 35 An
integral part of this effort was GHQ’s planned revision of the Meiji
Constitution. 36
Section 10 of the Potsdam Declaration required Japan to
effect political change establishing democracy and protecting civil
liberties. Section 12 stated that occupation would continue until the
changes outlined in the Declaration were completed to allied
satisfaction. GHQ made clear early on that amending the
Constitution was necessary to satisfy Section 12.
At first, Japan was reluctant to entirely replace the Meiji
Constitution. Matsumoto Joji (松本烝治), Japan’s Minister for
Constitutional Reform, led a committee of constitutional law experts
that recommended only modest changes in February of 1946. 37
Supreme Allied Commander General Douglas MacArthur rejected
this draft out of hand, instead directing GHQ to draft an entirely new
Constitution. 38 The authors of this new document—principally Army
lawyers Milo Rowell 39 and Courtney Whitney 40—attempted to take
into consideration historical influences on Japanese law, as well as

See, e.g., MARK FELTON, SLAUGHTER AT SEA: THE STORY OF JAPAN’S
NAVAL WAR CRIMES (2007); HARRIES, MEIRION HARRIES, SUSIE HARRIES,
SOLDIERS OF THE SUN: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE IMPERIAL JAPANESE ARMY
(1994); SHELDON HARRIS, FACTORIES OF DEATH: JAPANESE BIOLOGICAL
WARFARE 1932–945 (2010); BRIAN MACARTHUR, GUESTS OF THE EMPEROR: THE
SECRET HISTORY OF JAPAN’S MUKDEN POW CAMP (2005).
36
The Meiji Constitution, formally the Constitution of the Empire of
Japan, came into effect November 29, 1890. It was Japan’s first modern
Constitution. The main prior constitutional text was the ancient Seventeen-Article
Constitution, first recorded in the 8th Century. For further information, see
generally Calabresi, supra note 8. For background on the political ideas behind the
Meiji Restoration and the subsequent constitution, see C. D. A. Evans & Ishikawa
Hanako, A New Translation of Yoshida Shoin’s Taisaku Ichido, 8 J. JAPANESE PHIL.
(forthcoming 2021).
37
JOHN W. DOWER, EMBRACING DEFEAT: JAPAN IN THE WAKE OF
WORLD WAR II 351–54 (1999).
38 Id. at 360.
39 Id. at 364.
40 Id. at 373.
35
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guidance from Japanese legal scholars. 41 The Army’s draft was
presented to Japanese officials on February 13th, 1946. An outline
was released on March 6th, 1946. To preserve legal continuity, the
new Constitution was formally adopted as an amendment to the Meiji
Constitution, in accordance with Article 73. 42 The new Constitution
was approved on October 6th, 1946. 43 It became law on November
3rd, 1946 and came into effect on May 3rd, 1947. 44
The Post-War Constitution is approximately 5,000 words
long, containing a preamble and 103 articles. 45 The new Constitution
immediately gave rise to a number of interpretative controversies, but
it has never been amended. 46 Some of the controversy over the
Constitution arises because it was adopted on the instruction of an
occupying power. This has led to a debate between the “external
imposition” theory and the “internal consistency” theory. 47
The external imposition theory emphasizes that the
Constitution was imposed involuntarily on Japan by the occupying
Allied Powers. 48 A famous meeting on February 13th, 1946 provides
evidence to support this narrative. On that day, General Whitney met
with then Foreign Minister Yoshida Shigeru (吉田 茂) to discuss
constitutional reform. 49 Rather than making modifications to Minister
Matsumoto’s prior draft, Whitney handed out the draft written by
GHQ. 50 All sides were aware that GHQ was considering prosecuting

41 Id. at 364–74; see also J. Mark Ramseyer, Together Duped: How Japanese and
Americans Negotiated a Constitution without Communicating, 23 L. JAPAN 123, 123-126
(1990) (reviewing KYOKO INOUE, MACARTHUR’S JAPANESE CONSTITUTION: A
LINGUISTIC AND CULTURAL STUDY OF ITS MAKING (1991)).
42 Id. at 383–91.
43 Id. at 394–404.
44
NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION] (JAPAN).
45 See generally id.
46
MATSUI SHIGENORI, THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN: A CONTEXTUAL
ANALYSIS ch. 9, part I (2011).
47 Id.
48 See, e.g., Robert E. Ward, The Origins of the Present Japanese Constitution, 50
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 980 (1956).
49
DOWER, supra note 37, at 364.
50 Id. at 365.
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the Emperor, which Matsumoto sought to avoid at all costs. 51 In that
context, Whitney’s demand that Japan adopt GHQ’s draft seemed
like a threat. 52 On this recounting of events, the Constitution was
thrust upon the Japanese people by the United States. 53 Naturally, if
the Constitution was imposed by external forces, an independent
Japan might seek to amend or replace it. Indeed, some conservatives
have deployed this argument since ratification, 54 with a particular
focus on Article 9. 55
The “internal consistency” account, on the other hand,
emphasizes the degree to which GHQ’s draft was shaped by
Whitney’s sense of Japanese history and comments from Japanese
scholars. This theory stresses that GHQ’s draft was substantively
amended by Japanese parliamentarians, and notes that the language
of the Post-War Constitution has been subsequently interpreted to
reflect Japan’s values. 56 The internal consistency theory also
highlights the continuing public approval for the modern
Constitution, expressed in part by a lack of amendments. 57
Proponents of the internal consistency account are more cautious
about amending the Constitution. Similarly, they tend to focus less on
amending Article 9.

Id. at 352, 366.
Id. at 376–77.
53
For a description of this meeting from the Japanese side, see generally
SATO TATSUO, NIHONKOKU KENPO SEIRITSUSHI (1964) at Vol. 3, 47–57 [Japanese
language]. From the American side, see NIHONKOKU KEMPŌ SEITEI NO KATEI
(Takayanag et al. eds. 1987) at Vol. 1, 320–36 [Japanese language].
54 See e.g. ETO JUN, 1946 NEN KENPO: SONO KOSOKU (THE
CONSTITUTION OF 1946: ITS CONSTRAINT) (1980) [Japanese language].
55 See e.g. ETO JUN, TOZASARETA GENGO KUKAN: SENRYOGUN NO
KENNETSU TO SENGO NIHON (THE SEALED LINGUISTIC SPACE: THE
CENSORSHIP OF THE OCCUPATION FORCES AND POSTWAR JAPAN) (1994)
[Japanese language].
56 See, e.g., J. Mark Ramseyer, Book Review, 41 J. ASIAN STUD. 142 (1981)
(reviewing JAPAN’S COMMISSION ON THE CONSTITUTION: THE FINAL REPORT
(JOHN M. MAKI ed. & trans., 1981)).
57
Of course, the lack of amendments isn’t entirely due to overwhelming
approval—the Japanese Constitution is difficult to amend. See NIHONKOKU
KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 96 (Japan).
51
52
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A. Article 9
GHQ’s primary goal in drafting the new Constitution was to
prevent Japan from threatening East Asia after the Occupation
concluded. To that end, the Constitution includes extensive
restrictions on Japan’s future use of military force. The most
important restrictions are codified in Article 9. 58 The full text of
Article 9 reads:
ARTICLE 9.
(1) Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based
on justice and order, the Japanese people forever
renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and
the threat or use of force as means of settling
international disputes.
(2) In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding
paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other
war potential, will never be maintained. The right of
belligerency of the state will not be recognized. 59
Paragraph (1) renounces war as a sovereign right. This could
be interpreted to mean as little as renouncing the right to formally
declare war, while maintaining the right to self-defense (sometimes

58 See 13 Keishū 13, 3225, 3232, Sup. Ct. Grand Bench, Dec. 16, 1959,
http://www.courts.go.jp/app/hanrei_en/detail?id=13. For analysis of this case,
see also Miyoko Tsujimura, Kenpō [Constitution] 59 (2000). (Additional
restrictions on the use of armed force might be sourced to the Constitution’s
Preamble, which clearly states the document’s pacifist aims. But Japan’s Supreme
Court has held that this language is too vague to meaningfully restrict military
force, instead holding that the commitments in the Preamble are realized through
specific provisions in the subsequent text.).
59
NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 9 (Japan). (In the
original language, this section reads: “日本国憲法第九条 第1項 日本国民は、
正義と秩序を基調とする国際平和を誠実に希求し、国権の発動たる戦争
と、武力による威嚇又は武力の行使は、国際紛争を解決する手段として
は、永久にこれを放棄する。// 第2項 前項の目的を達するため、陸海
空軍その他の戦力は、これを保持しない。国の交戦権は、これを認めな
い。”).
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considered an inalienable sovereign right). 60 Or it could mean as
much as requiring the complete renunciation of any belligerent
activity whatsoever.
Paragraph (2) begins with a statement of purpose, which may
or may not constrain the remaining text. It then forbids “land, sea
and air forces”—whatever that means. Finally, it renounces the “right
of belligerency”—whatever that means.
1. Article 9, Paragraph 1
Most constitutional law scholars in Japan interpret Paragraph
1 of Article 9 to forbid the invasion of another country using force or
the threat of force. 61
The Japanese text is clearer here. In English, it is logically
possible that Article 9’s setting aside of “war as a sovereign right of
the nation” applies only “to the threat or use of force as a means of
settling international disputes.” In Japanese, it is clearer that the
“renunciation of war” is more general. 62
What is meant by “war . . . as a means of settling international
disputes?” Context from other treaties during this period helps
clarify. For example, the 1928 General Treaty for the Renunciation of
War uses the phrase “war for the solution of international
controversies.” 63 In that Treaty, the term meant invasion of other
countries. 64 Because of the similarity in language, the majority of

See, e.g., U.N. Charter art. 51.
See NOBUYOSHI ASHIBE, KENPŌGAKU I [CONSTITUTION STUDY] 529
(1992); see also Tsujimura, supra note 58, at 107–11.
62 See generally Ward, supra note 48.
63
General Treaty for the Renunciation of War, 46 Stat. 2343 (1928).
64 See Further Correspondence with Government of the United States Respecting the
United States Proposal for the Renunciation of War (June 23, 1928); B. J. C. MCKERCHER,
THE SECOND BALDWIN GOVERNMENT AND THE UNITED STATES, 1924-1929, at
246 (1984).
60
61
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scholars interpret Paragraph 1 to renounce only wars of invasion, not
self-defense. 65
While this is the majority view, some scholars disagree,
arguing that Paragraph 1 truly renounces all wars (including wars of
self-defense) 66—perhaps because it is too difficult to distinguish a
war of invasion from a war of self-defense. 67
2. Article 9, Paragraph 2
There are two major interpretations of Paragraph 2. The first
is that Paragraph 2 permits war for self-defense. The key, on this
account, is the prefatory clause: 68 “ . . . in order to accomplish the aim
of the preceding paragraph.” Because the aim of Paragraph 1 is to
renounce war “as a means of settling international disputes,” and the
phrase “as a means of settling international disputes” means, in
context, an invasion directed at foreign countries, the restriction on
maintaining armed forces applies only to the aim of not invading
foreign countries. Therefore, war in self-defense is permitted. 69 For
clarity, we call this first interpretation the “self-defense
interpretation.”
The second major interpretation does not read the prefatory
clause as limiting the scope of the operative clause. Under this
interpretation, Paragraph 2 fully renounces self-defense. 70 In the
immediate aftermath of the Second World War, particularly prior to
See NOBUYOSHI ASHIBE, supra note 61, at 257; KOKUSAI Hō
[INTERNATIONAL LAW] 310 (Kisaburo Yokota ed. 1966).)
66 See, e.g., MIYAZAWA TOSHIYOSHI, KENPŌ [CONSTITUTION] (1962).
67 See, e.g., TSUJIMURA, supra note 58, at 108 .
68
The Second Amendment to the United States Constitution has a similar
structure, containing both a prefatory clause (“A well-regulated Militia, being
necessary to the security of a free State”) and an operative clause (“the right of the
people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”). U.S. CONST. amend. II.
However, the United States Supreme Court has rejected a reading of the prefatory
clause that would limit the Amendment’s operative clause. District of Columbia v.
Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 578 (2008) (“But apart from that clarifying function, a
prefatory clause does not limit or expand the scope of the operative clause.”).
69
Ward, supra note 48.
70
NOBUYOSHI, supra note 61, at 259–61.
65
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the creation of the National Police Reserve (NPR) (警察予備隊), the
government operated under this interpretation. 71 Japan’s defense
strategy consequently relied on diplomatic alliances. 72 Around half of
constitutional law scholars in Japan now hold this perspective. 73 For
clarity, we call this interpretation the “pacifist interpretation.”
One strong argument in favor of the self-defense
interpretation is that Article 66, Paragraph 2 requires the Prime
Minister and other Ministers of State to be civilians. This restriction
would not make sense if military forces were forbidden, because if
that were the case, all Ministers would be civilians regardless. 74 The
Abe Administration has generally adopted the self-defense
interpretation, in part because of this argument. 75 Of course, the Abe
Administration’s interpretation still forbids invasion or other
aggressive military actions. 76
3. Constitutional Supremacy
Under the terms of Japan’s surrender in 1945, Japan accepted
fundamental limitations on her sovereignty. For the first time in
Japan’s history, Japan placed a foreign power legally above her own
government, subject to the constraints of the terms of surrender 77
and background international legal rules governing occupations. 78
General MacArthur represented the highest authority in Japan from
the beginning of the unconditional surrender until the Treaty of San
71 See, e.g., Shigeru Yoshida, Prime Minister, plenary session, House of
Representative, June 26, 1946 in Shimizu, Shingiroku 2: 82–83 [Japanese language].
72 See NOBUYOSHI, supra note 61, at 266.
73 See id. at 260 (surveying the field).
74 Id. at 258–61.
75
Interview with Dr. Tomohiko Taniguchi, Senior Adviser, Cabinet of
Japan, Tokyo, Japan (Jul. 11, 2019).
76
For the origin of this view, still in force, see Answer of Ichiro Yoshikuni
before the Budget Committee of the House of Councilors, Nov. 13, 1972, Sangiin
yosan iin kaigiroku [Budget Committee of House of Councilors Minutes], 70th Diet
Session, No. 5, at 2 (Nov. 13, 1972).
77 See generally ROBERT J. C. BUTOW, JAPAN’S DECISION TO SURRENDER
(1954).
78
Wladyslaw Czaplinski, Jus Cogens and the Law of Treaties, in THE
FUNDAMENTAL RULES OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 84-88 (2006).

15

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

2021

9:2

Francisco took effect in 1952, ending the occupation. 79 But just how
high does that highest authority go? Suppose that GHQ issued a
command that conflicted with the Constitution. Which would be
supreme?
This is a vexing question. On the one hand, we are used to
thinking of constitutions as the supreme law of the land. 80 On the
other hand, under the specific circumstances of an unconditional
surrender, there is a strong legal argument that GHQ had not just de
facto supremacy but also legal supremacy, at least during the
occupation. Certainly, GHQ acted that way in redrafting the Japanese
Constitution. 81 This question is particularly relevant to the JSDF
because the JSDF’s predecessor force was created by order of GHQ.
a.

History of the National Police Reserve / JSDF

During the occupation, it was initially GHQ policy to disarm
and demilitarize Japan. 82 However, as strategic circumstances
changed, American policy evolved. Early on, diplomat John Foster
Dulles 83 urged General MacArthur to support limited remilitarization.
MacArthur demurred, 84 but, after the outbreak of the Korean War,
was forced to redirect American troops to the Korean Peninsula. 85
This left Japan under-garrisoned. With Japan’s economy rapidly
recovering, MacArthur sent a letter to Prime Minister Yoshida on
July 8th, 1950, ordering the creation of the National Police Reserve
(NPR). 86

DOWER, supra note 37, at 80–87.
See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
81 See SATO, supra note 53.
82 See Kuzuhara Kazumi, The Korean War and the National Police Reserve of
Japan, 7 NIDS SECURITY REP. 95, 95 (2006).
83
Dulles served as Chief Negotiator for the Treaty of San Francisco and
later served as Secretary of State to President Eisenhower. See RICHARD H.
IMMERMAN, JOHN FOSTER DULLES: PIETY, PRAGMATISM AND POWER IN U.S.
FOREIGN POLICY xvii-xxvi (1988).
84 See Alan Millett, Dwight D. Eisenhower and the Korean War: Cautionary Tale
and Hopeful Precedent, 10 J. AM.-E. ASIAN REL. 155, 174 (2001).
85
Hiroshi, supra note 6, at 254.
86 Id. at 253.
79
80
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The NPR was duly created by Government Ordinance No.
260 (G.O.260) on August 10, 1950. 87 G.O.260 immediately raised
legal questions as it seemed, prima facie, to conflict with Article 9,
Paragraph 2 of the new Constitution.
Specifically, two questions arose: (1) does G.O.260 conflict
with A9P2? (2) if so, which authority trumps?
b.

Supreme Court Precedent: Sakata v. Japan

The Supreme Court considered the fundamental question of
the constitutionality of the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) (自衛
隊)—the NPR’s successor—in Sakata v. Japan. In 1955, angered by
plans to evict local residents in order to expand a nearby American
military base, protesters stormed the base’s airfield, in violation of
posted restrictions. 88 The protestors were tried and convicted, but
appealed, arguing that Article 9 forbade any military presence in
Japan, invalidating their convictions. 89
The Supreme Court concluded that Article 9 did not forbid
the JSDF. 90 While acknowledging the pacifist intentions of the
framers of Paragraph 2, 91 the Court held that nothing in the Article
prevented Japan from exercising her sovereign right of self-defense. 92

Id. at 254.
Sakata v. Japan, 13 Keishu 3225, 3225-27 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Dec. 16, 1959).
89 Id. at 98-99.
90 Id. (“[I]t cannot be acknowledged that the stationing of the United States
armed forces is immediately, clearly unconstitutional and void, contravening the
purport of Article 9. . . . [O]n the contrary, it must be held that it is in accord with
the intent and purpose of these constitutional provisions.”).
91 Id. (“We, the people of Japan, do not maintain the so-called war potential
provided in paragraph 2, Article 9 of the Constitution, but we have determined to
supplement the shortcomings in our national defense resulting therefrom by
trusting in the justice and faith of the peace loving people of the world, and thereby
preserve our peace and existence.”).
92 Id. (“[C]ertainly there is nothing in [Article 9] which would deny the right
of self-defense inherent in our nation as a sovereign power. The pacifism
advocated in our Constitution was never intended to mean defenselessness or
nonresistance”.).
87
88
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The Supreme Court concluded that self-defense is an inalienable right
of all sovereign states and cannot be waived. 93
A natural law approach might understand the right to selfdefense as a fundamental property of sovereignty; 94 but the Japanese
Supreme Court did not take this approach. 95 Instead, the Court
grounded the inherent right of self-defense in general concepts of
international law. 96 The Court considered three main ways the right
of self-defense might be waived. 97 First, by international law, if Japan
were to sign a broad global treaty foregoing the right of selfdefense. 98 Second, by transnational law, if Japan were to sign a treaty
with specific countries so forbidding the right. 99 Third, by domestic
supremacy, on the assumption that the Constitution has supremacy
over international commitments. In Japan’s case, arguably, all three
conditions apply. The San Francisco Peace Treaty, signed by Japan at
the close of the occupation, seems to imply that Japan will forego
self-defense. 100 Similarly, the U. S.—Japan Security Treaty of 1952 (
日本国とアメリカ合衆国との間の相互協力及び安全保障条約
) assumes a minimal role for Japan. 101 Third, Article 9 itself arguably
alienates Japan’s right to self-defense. 102

Sakata v. Japan, 13 Keishu 3225 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Dec. 16, 1959) (quoting
supplemental opinion of Justice Kotaro Tanaka: “[t]he fact that a state possesses
the right of self-defense for the sake of preserving its national existence is
universally recognized”).
94
JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980).
95
Japan’s Supreme Court has steadfastly maintained a positivist approach
to law common to East Asian jurisdictions that inherited the German approach to
legal interpretation. For further analysis, see generally Bernd Martin & Peter Wetzler,
The German Role in the Modernization of Japan—The Pitfall of Blind Acculturation, 33
ORIENS EXTREMUS 77 (1990).
96
Sakata v. Japan, 13 Keishu 3225 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Dec. 16, 1959).
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100
Treaty of Peace with Japan art. 19, Sept. 8, 1951, 3. U.S.T. 3169, 136
U.N.T.S. 45.
101
Security Treaty Between the United States and Japan, Japan-U.S., art. I,
Sept. 8, 1951, 3 U.S.T. 3329 (“Japan grants, and the United States of America
accepts, the right, upon the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace and of this
Treaty, to dispose United States land, air and sea forces in and about Japan. Such
93
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However, the Court did not think that any of these events
indicated an intention to forego self-defense. 103 Instead, the Court
held that these provisions barred only offensive or aggressive military
conduct. 104
Because Article 9 did not preclude self-defense, the Court
gave great deference to the Parliament and the Prime Minister in
matters of defense policy. 105 Entering a security alliance is a political
decision, the Court held, properly the province of the democratically
selected branches of the state. 106 Therefore, the Court held that the

forces may be utilized to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and
security in the Far East and to the security of Japan against armed attack from
without, including assistance given at the express request of the Japanese
Government to put down largescale internal riots and disturbances in Japan, caused
through instigation or intervention by an outside power or powers . . . “).
102
NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION] art. 9 (Japan).
103
Sakata v. Japan, 13 Keishu 3225 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Dec. 16, 1959) (“ . . . we
are free to choose whatever method or means deemed appropriate to accomplish
our objectives in the light of the actual international situation, as long as such
measures are for the purpose of preserving the peace and security of our country”).
104 Id. (“This Article renounces . . . war and prohibits the maintenance of
. . . war potential, but certainly there is nothing in it which would deny the right of
self-defense. . . . [T]he pacifism advocated in our Constitution was never intended
to mean defenselessness.”)
105 Id. (“The Security Treaty, therefore . . . is featured with an extremely
high degree of political consideration, having bearing upon the very existence of
our country as a sovereign power”). This deference is echoed in other cases. See,
e.g., Itazuke, supra note 14.
106 Id. (“Accordingly, unless the said treaty is obviously unconstitutional
and void, it falls outside the purview of the power of judicial review granted to the
court . . . [the wisdom of the Treaty] should be left primarily to the Cabinet which
has the power to conclude treaties and [the Parliament] which has the power to
ratify them.”)
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U.S.-Japan Security Treaty was constitutional 107— any recourse for
the protestors would have to come from the ballot box. 108
At the time of Sakata, the JSDF was capable only of
defensive action. The constitutionality of a more expanded force
remains an open question. 109
c.

Incorporation by Treaty

Japan regained full sovereignty with the Treaty of San
Francisco (サンフランシスコ講和条約), signed by 49 nations on
September 8th, 1951. 110 The Treaty took effect on April 28, 1952,
officially ending the Allied Occupation of Japan. 111 The US-Japan
Security Treaty was signed the same day, as part of the same
process. 112 One might think that, having resumed full sovereignty,
Japan was no longer under any obligation to obey an order from the
United States. But this is not entirely the case. Although Article 1 of
the Treaty of San Francisco restores sovereignty to Japan, many of
the Treaty’s articles explicitly reaffirm and incorporate decisions
made by the occupying Allied Powers. 113 Other parts of the Treaty
reaffirm certain interpretations of Article 9, explicitly permitting
collective self-defense. 114

107 Id. (“It cannot be acknowledged that the stationing of the United States
armed forces is immediately, clearly unconstitutional and void, contravening the
purport of Article 9, paragraph 2 of Article 98, and the Preamble of the
Constitution. On the contrary, it must be held that it is in accord with the intent
and purpose of these constitutional provisions.”).
108 Id. (“[t]he wisdom of the Treaty] should be left . . . ultimately to the
political consideration of the people with whom rests the sovereign power of the
nation”).
109 See generally Sakata v. Japan, 13 Keishu 3225 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Dec. 16,
1959).
110
Treaty of Peace with Japan, supra note 16.
111 Id.
112
Security Treaty Between the United States and Japan, supra note 101.
113
For example, Article 4(b) affirms decisions regarding the disposition of
property located in overseas territory. Treaty of Peace with Japan, supra note 16.
114
For example, Article 5(iii)(c) retains the right to individual and collective
self-defense. Id.
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Clarifying the legality of orders issued during the occupation,
Article 8 recognizes as binding law “the full force of all treaties now
or hereafter concluded by the Allied Powers.” 115 In addition, Article
19(d) reads:
(d) Japan recognizes the validity of all acts and
omissions done during the period of occupation
under or in consequence of directives of the
occupation authorities or authorized by Japanese law
at that time.
Article 19(d) applies to orders issued by the Supreme Allied
Commander, including his letter on July 8, 1950 creating the NPR. 116
The JSDF evolved out of the NPR and General Order 260. G.O.260
(and its successor enabling acts) are incorporated by treaty into the
Post-War Japanese legal and political system. The Treaty of San
Francisco, including Article 19(d), remains in force to this day. 117
Despite this, of course, Japan’s (unamended) 1946 Constitution
remains the law of the land.
In the United States, we are used to thinking of the
Constitution as the highest law—a supreme document that
encompasses, as Hart puts it, our Rules of Recognition, Arbitration
and Change. 118 In Japan, the situation is murkier. The Constitution
clearly has priority over ordinary legislation. 119 It also (probably) has
priority over international treaties. 120 But the Treaty of San Francisco
Id. at art. 8.
Prime Minister Yoshida’s speech at the signing and his personal
reflections make it abundantly clear that continuing legal force was intended. See
generally Treaty of Peace with Japan, supra note 16; Yoshida Shigeru, Prime Minister
of Japan, Speech on Signing Treaty of San Francisco (Sept. 7, 1951); Yoshida
Shigeru, supra note 71.
117 See Articles 4(b), 5(iii)(c), 6(a) and 8 all reference continuing legal
authority of actions taken during the occupation. See NIHONKOKU KENPŌ
[KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 4(b), 5(iii), 6(a), 8 (Japan) (formally incorporating as
legal various actions taken during the occupation).
118 See generally H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961).
119
Satoh Junichi, Judicial Review in Japan, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 603, 606–07
(2008).
120 Id. at 623–24.
115
116
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is more complicated. The Constitution of Japan reifies the will of the
Japanese people. 121 But Japan only has the sovereign authority to reify
its peoples will because of its acceptance of the terms of
unconditional surrender. In this sense, then, Japan’s contract to
uphold the terms of the Treaty of San Francisco could represent a
higher legal authority even than the Constitution, for the latter could
not exist without the former. 122
Consequently, even if the JSDF possessed offensive capacity
that could potentially violate Article 9, Paragraph 2 under the
reasoning in Sakata, that capacity might still be legally permissible,
because where Article 9, Paragraph 2 conflicts with the orders of
GHQ (incorporated by the Treaty of San Francisco), arguably, the
Treaty has priority. We tackle this thorny and complex issue at length
in Part II.
B. Attempts to Amend the Constitution: A History of Controversy
Since 1952, several proposals to revise the Constitution have
been advanced. 123 The Constitution requires that Amendments be
approved first by a two-thirds supermajority in the Diet (Japan’s
Parliament), and then submitted to a popular referendum. 124 No
amendment has ever made it past the Diet.
1. Background, History of Constitutional Reform
Efforts to amend the Japanese Constitution have focused on
some of the more ambiguous parts of the text. These include the
Constitution’s anomalous and rather vague description of the
Emperor, 125 the absence of environmental protection or special

NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION] pmbl. (Japan).
This is a controversial position, of course, discussed at great length by
scholars. See REPORT OF THE ADVISORY PANEL, supra note 21.
123
As a good overview of arguments in favor of amending the
Constitution, see generally WATANABE OSAMU, NIHONKOKU KENPŌ KAISEI SHI
[A HISTORY OF ATTEMPTS TO REVISE THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN] 231–33
(1987).
124
NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION] art. 96 (Japan).
125 Id. at art. 1–8.
121
122
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protections for persons with disabilities, 126 limitations on the funding
of religion 127 and, of course, Article 9. While many of these changes
are controversial, changes to Article 9 may be the most controversial
of all. 128
It is easy to see why many successive governments have
desired to amend Article 9. First, as discussed above, the language is
vague and open to many interpretations. Second, the way the
language interacts with the Treaty of San Francisco creates significant
unresolved legal questions. An Amendment could clarify matters and
add legitimacy through a public referendum. 129
Politically, however, revision of the Constitution has proven
unpopular. Even Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro, widely
considered the strongest post-War Prime Minister until the present
Abe administration, 130 downplayed constitutional revision between
1982 and 1987, fearing a lack of public support. 131 Indeed, despite
decades of attempts, the Constitution has never been amended. 132
Nevertheless, the governing Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has
adopted several party platforms calling for revision of the
constitution. The most serious recent efforts came in 2005 and 2012,
when the LDP released two draft amendments.

Id.
The Japanese Constitution, in effect, already incorporates amendment
language proposed (and rejected) by Senator James Blaine in the 19th century. See
Kakunaga v. Sekiguchi (Supreme Court of Japan, Grand Bench) 31 Minshū 4, 522,
533 (1977).
128 Poll Shows 56% of Japanese Oppose Amending Constitution under Abe
Government, KYODO NEWS WIRE (July 24, 2019), https://www.japantimes.co.jp/
news/2019/07/24/national/politics-diplomacy/56-japanese-oppose-amendingconstitution-abe-government-poll-shows/#.XiXEGRdKh0s (noting the specific
public opposition to proposals to amend Article 9).
129
Interview with Eiichi Hasegawa, Special Adviser, Prime Minister of
Japan, Tokyo, Japan (Dec. 11, 2019).
130
Robert Angel, Prime Ministerial Leadership in Japan: Recent Changes in
Personal Style and Administrative Organization, 61 PACIFIC AFF. 583, 583 (1988).
131
GERALD CURTIS, THE LOGIC OF JAPANESE POLITICS: LEADERS,
INSTITUTIONS, AND THE LIMITS OF CHANGE 147 (1999).
132
NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION] (Japan).
126
127
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2. 2005 Constitutional Reform Proposal
Prime Minister Koizumi proposed the first of these draft
amendments on November 22nd, 2005. 133 The first part of this
amendment was aimed at Article 9, clarifying the status of the
JSDF. 134 The 2005 amendment also created a separate and welldefined system of military courts, clarifying the unresolved legal
question of JSDF jurisdiction. Additional amendments focused on
other areas of legal ambiguity, such as: (a) removing the strict bar on
funding religious institutions (which, for example, bans public
funding of military chaplains); (b) making technical modifications to
the relationship between the central government and the prefectures,
increasing federalism; and, (c) modifying the constitutional
amendment process to make further amendments easier.
The 2005 draft was controversial and fiercely debated. Nearly
all of the American coverage of the debate focused on the political
dynamics of the proposed amendment, with the LDP and PM
Koizumi roundly castigated for attempting to reverse “Japan’s
pacifist Constitution.” 135 Little to no English-language writing
pointed out that the Amendment was principally drafted to resolve
unclear legal questions. Even English-language voices sympathetic to
constitutional change focused on the geopolitical forces motivating
the revision of Article 9, particularly rising Chinese ambitions. 136 The
legal aspect of the debate was almost entirely ignored.
In the end, no formal amendment was proposed, because
Prime Minister Koizumi retired after a then-unusually long nearly
See Canon Pence, Reform in the Rising Sun: Koizumi’s Bid to Revise Japan’s
Pacifist Constitution, 32 N. C. J. INTL’L. & COM. REG. 335 (2006) (“On November 22,
2005 the ruling coalition of Japan, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), released a
draft proposal to reform the Constitution.”).
134 Id. at 336 (“The most significant change proposed by the LDP, and
arguably the chief purpose of the draft revision, is to remove the war renunciation
language of Article 9 of the constitution.”).
135 See, e.g., Id. at 380 (“In a move that some say undermines the principle
of pacifism and ignores the lessons of Japan’s past, the new draft . . . “).
136
In this context, the 2004 incursion into Japanese territorial water of a
submerged Chinese submarine was particularly significant. See Mizuho Aoki, Chinese
Submarine Intrusion Considered an Act of Provocation, JAPAN TIMES (Nov. 13, 2004).
133
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five-year term. 137 Prime Minister Abe took over from 2006-2007, but
was unable to form a stable enough coalition to push the amendment
proposal. 138 At the same time, the amendment package was
underwater in the polls, in part because an influential panel of legal
experts pointed out that several constitutional ambiguities (like the
status of the Emperor) were actually not resolved by the 2005
Proposal. 139 In an effort to address these concerns, Abe proposed
that the Parliament pass legislation allowing for a national
referendum on constitutional revision, with the details to be
hammered out later on in the process. 140 Amid protests and low
approval ratings, the Government ultimately decided not to move
forward.
The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) and allied parties took
control of the Japanese Parliament in a historic election in 2008. 141 As
constitutional reform had long been associated with the LDP, the
DPJ did not push for it at all, though parts of the DPJ coalition
actually favored many of the proposed reforms (for example, a
constitutional amendment to prohibit disability discrimination). 142

Reiji Yoshida & Kazuaki Nagata, Koizumi to exit political stage, JAPAN
TIMES (Sept. 26, 2008), https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2008/09/26/
national/koizumi-to-exit-political-stage/.
138 Japanese Prime Minister Resigns, BBC NEWS (Sept. 12, 2007, 4:17 PM),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6990519.stm (“ . . . but his poll ratings
plummeted amid a row over pensions and a series of financial scandals involving
some of his cabinet ministers”).
139 Japan approves constitution steps, BBC NEWS (May 14, 2007, 8:45 AM),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6652809.stm (“Public opinion in Japan
on the issue also appears to be mixed”).”)
140
Kyodo, Response to Abe’s Drive: Support Falls for Amending Constitution,
JAPAN TIMES (Apr. 17, 2007), cited in JAPAN’S POLITICS AND ECONOMY:
PERSPECTIVES ON CHANGE 65 (Marie Söderberg & Patricia A. Nelson eds., 2010).
141 ’Major Win’ for Japan Opposition, BBC NEWS (Aug, 30, 2009, 4:37 PM),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8229368.stm (“The DPJ has won 300
seats in the 480-seat lower house, ending 50 years of almost unbroken rule by the
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) . . . DPJ leader Yukio Hatoyama hailed the win as
a revolution.”).
142
Interview with Takeuchi Norio, Member of Parliament, Constitutional
Democratic Party, New York, N.Y. (Apr. 16, 2019).
137
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The DPJ government collapsed in 2011-2012, in a landslide general
election victory for the LDP and Prime Minister Abe. 143
3. 2012 Constitutional Reform Proposal
As part of the parliamentary campaign in 2012, the LDP
released a new proposal for constitutional reform. 144 The new reform
proposal contained several changes and represents the most recent
plan to formally amend the Constitution.
First, the proposal revised the Constitution’s preamble,
modifying some of its theoretical and normative language. Similarly,
the language regarding human rights is somewhat revised. 145 Next,
the new amendment formally defines the Emperor as the Head of
State, as well as codifying Japan’s national flag and anthem. 146
Controversially, the new draft permits the Government to restrict
public expression for the public interest or to support public order. 147
The new draft also proposes a new system of patents and intellectual
property rights, 148 makes it harder for public workers to unionize 149
and adds new rights, including protection of privacy, 150 accountability
of the State, 151 environmental protections 152 and the rights of victims
of crimes. 153 Discrimination against persons with disabilities is also
prohibited. 154 The draft deletes a clause prohibiting the establishment
143 See
generally TOMOHITO SHINODA, CONTEMPORARY JAPANESE
POLITICS: INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES AND POWER SHIFTS (2013).
144 Id.
145
For example, instances of the phrase “public welfare” are replaced by
the phrase “public interest.” Policy Platform of the LDP, supra note 20, at 19.
146 Id. at 22.
147 Id. at 19.
148 Id. at 11.
149 Id. at 10.
150 Id. at 3.
151 Id. at 3.
152 Id. at 28.
153 Id. at 3.
154
Policy Platform of the LDP, supra note 20, at 19. The amendment
proposal would add this to the Constitution; Japan presently prohibits
discrimination against persons with disability through legislation alone. See generally
KATHARINA HEYER, RIGHTS ENABLED: THE DISABILITY REVOLUTION, FROM THE
US, TO GERMANY AND JAPAN, TO THE UNITED NATIONS 123–66 (2015); see also
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of religion, 155 changes the way that Supreme Court judges are
reviewed 156 and makes it easier to pass further amendments to the
Constitution in the future. 157
Many of these provisions were controversial in Japan and
generated an enormous amount of public debate. 158 However, the
bulk of the English-language commentary focused on the proposal’s
amendments to Article 9. 159 The proposed draft amends Article 9 to
state that a formal national defense force is authorized, with the
Prime Minister as commander in chief. 160 The proposed amendment
still requires the self-defense forces to remain defensive. 161
Additionally, the amendment adds a procedure for the government to
declare a national emergency, permitting expedited law-making
during such crises. 162 It is important to understand the context of
these proposals. They go beyond the 2005 draft amendment, aiming
to address a broader range of legal issues. Although the substance of
these reforms is very much legal, little to none of the Englishlanguage material discussed the legal dimensions of the constitutional
amendment debate. 163

Adam P. Liff & Ko Maeda, Order from Chaos: Why Shinzo Abe Faces an Uphill Battle to
Revise Japan’s Constitution, Brookings, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-fromchaos/2018/12/15/why-shinzo-abe-faces-an-uphill-battle-to-revise-japansconstitution/ (discussing the public debate back and forth over various different
constitutional amendment proposals).
155 Id. at 22.
156 Id. at 12.
157 Id. at 29.
158
Masami Ito, Constitution Again Faces Calls for Revision to Meet
Reality, JAPAN TIMES, (May 1, 2012), https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2012/05
/01/reference/constitution-again-faces-calls-for-revision-to-meet-reality/
(discussing the divide between security experts who seek an amendment to the
Constitution formalizing the legal structure of the JSDF and general public opinion
against it).
159
Mizobuchi, supra note 12.
160
Policy Platform of the LDP, supra note 20, at 2.
161 Id. at 2.
162 Id. at 2.
163
Mizobuchi, supra note 12.
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4. Current Status
Despite decades of debate, most opinion polls continue to
show that the majority of Japanese citizens oppose amending the
Constitution or changing Article 9. 164 Nevertheless, constitutional
revision remains a priority for the LDP. 165 As recently as the last
Parliamentary election, Prime Minister Abe spoke at length on the
importance of amending the Constitution, although with less
specificity than his previous proposals. 166 The continuing salience of
the constitutional amendment issue is one of the major fault lines in
Japanese politics, as evinced by the name of one of Japan’s strongest
opposition parties, the Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP). 167
There are also major strategic implications—the United States

Craig Mark, Japan Debates Changing Its Pacifist Constitution, THE
DIPLOMAT (May 18, 2017), https://thediplomat.com/2017/05/japan-debateschanging-its-pacifist-constitution/ (“But the pacifist sentiments of a majority of the
Japanese people could be the greatest obstacle to passing any referendum. A recent
Kyodo News poll found 49 percent support for changing Article 9, with 47 percent
against. But another NHK poll had only 25 percent for change, with 57 percent
opposed.”).
165 Id. (“Prime Minister Shinzo Abe declared ‘the time is ripe to begin a
debate on possible change.’”).
166 Id. (“Abe said that since the war-renouncing clauses would be
maintained, Japanese forces would not join wars abroad. He claimed many legal
scholars consider the forces’ very existence unconstitutional – hence his motive for
proposing constitutional change was merely to resolve this ambiguity, and therefore
improve Japan’s overall security.”)
167 2017 Lower House Election / Edano Announces Launch of New Party of
Liberals, THE YOMIURI SHIMBUN (Oct. 2, 2017, 8:34 PM), the-japannews.com/news/article/0003978833 [https://web.archive.org/web/201710022157
42/http:/the-japan-news.com/news/article/0003978833]; see also Liff, supra n. 154
(discussing the ambivalence of the LDP’s coalition partner and disputes between
the parties over the Constitution).
164
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generally supports an Amendment of Article 9, 168 while China and
North Korea both strongly oppose it. 169
Politics continues to play a central role in shaping the
constitutional amendment debate. However, in our view, there is no
denying that legal ambiguity plays a major role as well, particularly
with regard to Article 9. While English-language writing often covers
the political debate at great length, very little of it addresses the legal
issues. We aim to take a step toward filling that gap in Part II.
II. THE LEGAL BASIS FOR THE REINTERPRETATION
We now direct our attention toward the legal arguments
surrounding Article 9 and the 2014 Reinterpretation permitting
collective self-defense. We begin by recounting the historical and
political background of the 2014 Reinterpretation. We then discuss
the political and scholarly response, with a focus on English-language
commentary. Finally, we delve into the many legal intricacies
surrounding Article 9.
A. The Reinterpretation
In the summer of 2014, the Cabinet of Japan announced that
it was adopting an interpretation of Article 9 that permitted collective
self-defense. 170 Collective self-defense refers to the defense of allied
units in military operations. 171 For example, suppose that two
Japanese and American destroyers were sailing in joint formation. If
the Japanese ship came under attack, the American ship could come
Jeffrey P. Richter, Japan’s “Reinterpretation” of Article 9: A Pyrrhic Victory
for American Foreign Policy? 101 IOWA L. REV. 1223 (2016) (“ . . . as it has for decades
been pushing Japan to repeal Article 9 so that it could assist the United States and
its allies during the Cold War”).
169 Id. (“Japan’s neighbors—particularly China—have responded to this
[attempt to revise the Constitution to normalize the JSDF] . . . with widespread
condemnation”).
170
Richter, supra note 168.
171 Id. (“For international lawyers the phrase ‘collective self-defense’ refers
primarily to the well-established UN Charter right of States to defend other States.
This right pertains to the jus ad bellum, that is, the law that governs when a State may
use force against or in the territory of another State.”)
168
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to its aid—collectively defending the group. The Japanese ship could,
of course, also defend itself. 172 Prior to the summer of 2014,
however, if the American ship came under attack first, it was legally
unclear whether the Japanese ship could come to the American ship’s
aid. Such an action would constitute collective self-defense, which the
law did not clearly permit. 173
After reactivating a panel of scholars and reviewing their
report,
the Cabinet adopted an official understanding that
collective self-defense is lawful under Article 9. 175 This process and
decision is referred to as the “Reinterpretation of 2014,” the “2014
Reinterpretation” or just the “Reinterpretation.”
174

For decades, Japanese military planners operated as if
collective self-defense was prohibited. 176 But there was little practical
need to act otherwise. 177 Since the end of World War II, Japan’s
principal security partner has been the United States, 178 and, until very
recently, American naval supremacy made it difficult to imagine that
Japanese naval assets would be called on to assist American vessels. 179
The rise in the capacity and size of the Chinese armed forces
has significantly changed this calculus. 180 Since 2000, while American
See generally YOSHIKAZU WATANABE ET AL., THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE
ROLE OF THE JAPANESE SELF-DEFENSE FORCES 13-24 (Sasakawa Peace
Found. USA 2017).
173
Interview with Dr. Tomohiko Taniguchi, Senior Adviser, Cabinet of
Japan, Tokyo, Japan (Jul. 11, 2019).
174
REPORT OF THE ADVISORY PANEL, supra note 21.
175 Id. at 2.
176
Takei Tomohisa, Japan Maritime Self Defense Force in the New Maritime Era,
34 HATOU 4, 5 (2008).
177
Interview with Kanehara Nobukatsu, Deputy Assistant, Chief Cabinet
Secretary of Japan, in Tokyo, Japan (Dec. 14, 2015).
178
DOWER, supra note 37.
179 See David Lague & Benjamin Kang Lim, Special Report: China’s Vast Fleet
is Tipping the Balance in the Pacific, REUTERS (Apr. 30, 2019, 7:30 AM),
https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/china-army-navy/
(“Globally, the U.S. Navy remains the dominant maritime force, the power that
keeps the peace and maintains freedom of navigation on the high seas.”).
180 Id. (“In just over two decades, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the
Chinese military, has mustered one of the mightiest navies in the world. This
172
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military expenditures have risen only modestly, 181 Chinese military
expenditures have exploded. 182 China has also continued aggressive
island-building in the Spartly Islands, 183 part of an area-denial tactical
doctrine intended to neutralize American blue-water fleet
superiority. 184 These technological and policy developments have
significantly increased the threat level for the American Seventh Fleet
and other naval units. 185
Before these developments, Japan declined to engage in
collective self-defense simply because it was not strategically
necessary. The debate over collective self-defense is not about a
settled matter of constitutional law, rather it is about a novel question
arising from changing geo-strategic circumstances. As American
strategists increasingly asked Japan to assist in collective self-defense,

increased Chinese firepower at sea—complemented by a missile force that in some
areas now outclasses America’s—has changed the game in the Pacific . . . In raw
numbers, the PLA navy now has the world’s biggest fleet. It is also growing faster
than any other major navy.”).
181 See United States Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 2009 Budget
Request (Feb. 4, 2008), https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/
defbudget/fy2009/FY2009_Budget_Request_Justification.pdf at 6 (reflecting a
relatively constant expenditure in terms of GDP).
182 See Lague & Kang Lim, supra note 179 (“Under Xi, the Communist
Party has also opened the funding tap. Between 2015 and 2021, total military
outlays are projected to jump 55 percent from $167.9 billion to $260.8 billion. . . .
Over the same period, the navy’s share of this budget is expected to increase 82
percent, from $31.4 billion to $57.1 billion, the report said”).
183 See Kurt M. Campbell & Ely Ratner, The China Reckoning, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS, (Mar./Apr. 2018), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/201802-13/china-reckoning.
184 Id. (“For Beijing, the United States’ alliances and military presence in
Asia posed unacceptable threats to China’s interests in Taiwan, on the Korean
Peninsula, and in the East China and South China Seas . . . So China started to chip
away at the U.S.-led security order in Asia, developing the capabilities to deny the
U.S. military access to the region and driving wedges between Washington and its
allies.”).
185
Kurt M. Campbell & Jake Sullivan, Competition Without Catastrophe,
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, (Sept./Oct. 2019), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/
china/competition-with-china-without-catastrophe.
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the issue of Japan’s legal capacity to do so became particularly
salient. 186
After internal deliberations in 2012 and 2013, the Cabinet
sought out external guidance on this complex legal question. 187 In
2014, the Prime Minister reactivated a special panel to advise the
Cabinet on whether or not Article 9 permitted collective self-defense,
drawing on the expertise of retired policymakers and legal scholars. 188
The panel released a report arguing that collective self-defense was
lawful, 189 and the Cabinet accepted that conclusion. 190
From the beginning, the Cabinet’s examination was intended
to resolve serious legal questions affecting Japan’s security. 191 There is
a significant strategic cost to the ambiguity of the current legal status
of the Self-Defense Forces. 192 For example, in the summer of 2019,
President Trump asked allied nations to assist the United States in a
mission patrolling the Suez Canal. 193 Given the sophistication of
Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Forces, 194 and the alliance between
Japan and the United States, 195 it seemed natural for Japan to
contribute. 196 Indeed, Japan would very much have liked to do so. 197
Interview with Dr. Tomohiko Taniguchi, supra note 75.
REPORT OF THE ADVISORY PANEL, supra note 21.
188 Id. at 54–55.
189 Id. at 32.
190
Linda Seig & Kiyoshi Takenaka, Japan Takes Historic Step from Post-War
Pacifism, OKs Fighting for Allies, REUTERS (June 30, 2014), https://
www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-defense/japan-takes-historic-step-from-postwar-pacifism-oks-fighting-for-allies-idUSKBN0F52S120140701.
191 See REPORT OF THE ADVISORY PANEL, supra note 21, at 1–4.
192
Interview with Dr. Tomohiko Taniguchi, supra note 75.
193 Id.
194 See Japanese Aircraft Carrier, GLOBALSECURITY.ORG (Aug. 3, 2012),
https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/japan/ddh-x-aircraft-carrier.htm
(“With the decline of Russian naval strength, the Self- Defense Forces’ fighting
vessels and aircraft rank second in the world, behind the United States.”).
195 See Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United
States and Japan, Japan-U.S., Jan. 19, 1960, 11 U.S.T. 1632; T.I.A.S. No. 4509.
196
Interview with Dr. Tomohiko Taniguchi, supra note 75.
197
Japanese strategists viewed a dispatch of force as helpful to Japan’s
strategic interest, since positively responding to American requests enhance security
cooperation. Id.
186
187
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But there were serious legal concern within the Abe
Administration. 198 Armed forces operating officially, in uniform and
fighting under a declared flag, enjoy special legal protections under
the laws of war. 199 Of course, rouge nations might violate
international law and disregard those protections. 200 But, as Louis
Henken once observed, nearly all nations follow nearly all of
international law nearly all of the time. 201 The protections extended to
soldiers impacts their safety, and the safety of deployed personnel is
(and ought to be) a significant concern for any state. 202
Suppose that Japan dispatched Maritime Self-Defense Forces
to join the American multi-lateral force. 203 And suppose that these
forces were then captured and held as prisoners. Would they enjoy
similar protections to American forces captured under similar
circumstances? As the law stands, there is a good argument that they
should; but there is also a real argument that they should not, that the
Self-Defense Forces are unconstitutional, and that soldiers claiming
to so-affiliate are enemy combatants—or something else entirely. 204
This ambiguity weakens the deterrent and protective effect of
international law, so well-established by Henken and others. 205 It was
also a significant factor in persuading the Cabinet that it ultimately
Id.
U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., LAW OF WAR MANUAL § XX (2016).
200 See Anna Holligan, Radovan Karadzic Sentence Increased to Life at UN
Tribunal, BBC NEWS (Mar. 20, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe47642327.
201
LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE 47 (2d ed. 1979).
202
One of the main reasons, no doubt, that the Conventions have been so
widely signed. See Jean S. Pictet. The New Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War
Victims, 45 AM. J. INT’L L. 462 (1951).
203
A proposal that was actually considered quite seriously. See Takenaka,
supra note 11.
204 See Bruce Ackerman & Matsudaira Tokujin, A militarized Japan?, L.A.
TIMES (Jan. 11, 2013, 12:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/la-xpm-2013jan-11-la-oe-ackerman-japan-constitution-20130111-story.html (Here, Professor
Ackerman argues that the current defense forces are unconstitutional and Japanese
overseas deployment is unlawful—he does not, of course, say Japanese combatants
should be treated poorly.).
205 See Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106
YALE L.J. 2599, 2599–2603 (1997).
198
199
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could not join the United States’ multi-lateral force. 206 The legal
ambiguity had a profound effect on important decisions of Japanese
foreign policy, causing Japan to instead dispatch naval forces under
her own authority, with more limited rules of engagement. 207
All of this goes to show that there is a real legal problem
when it comes to the status of the Self-Defense Forces—one rooted
in the documentary history of the Constitution. This legal ambiguity
produces practical consequences for policy. And the Reinterpretation
clarified some of this uncertainty. 208
B. Response to the Reinterpretation
The conventional narrative in the English-language literature
is that the Reinterpretation was solely, and shallowly, motivated by
political pragmatism. 209 Variations of this account dominate Englishlanguage writing. 210 That narrative goes something like this: Prime
Minister Abe very much wishes to amend Article 9. 211 He cannot,
because the Japanese people oppose it. 212 So, for political reasons, he
Taniguchi, supra note 173.
Takenaka, supra note 11 (“Japan, a U.S. ally that has maintained friendly
ties with Iran, has opted to launch its own operation rather than join a U.S.-led
mission to protect shipping in the region.”).
208
REPORT OF THE ADVISORY PANEL, supra note 21.
209 E.g., Craig Martin, The danger in Abe’s constitutional amendment proposal,
JAPAN TIMES (Aug. 5, 2019), https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2019/08/05/
commentary/japan-commentary/danger-abes-constitutional-amendment-proposal/
(“But this amendment proposal was politically impossible to move forward, and so
Abe then attempted to achieve many of the same results through a
‘reinterpretation’ of Article 9, through a Cabinet decision issued in 2014, followed
by its implementation through the national security legislation enacted in 2015 . . .
“).
210 See, e.g., Michael A. Panton, Japan’s Article 9: Rule of Law v. Flexible
Interpretation, 24 TEMPLE INT’L & COMP L.J. 129 (2010).
211
This premise is true. See Japan’s Abe Hopes for Reform of Pacifist Charter by
2020, REUTERS (May 3, 2017, 1:34 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/usjapan-government-constitution-idUSKBN17Z0BH.
212 Poll Shows 54% Oppose Revision of Japan’s Pacifist Constitution under Abe’s
Watch, JAPAN TIMES (Apr. 11, 2019), https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2019/
04/11/national/politics-diplomacy/poll-shows-54-oppose-revision-japans-pacifistconstitution/#.Xi-TaBdKhR0.
206
207
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has forced through a de facto amendment (the Reinterpretation) to
achieve some of his desired constitutional changes. 213
Approaching the Reinterpretation with an eye toward
background social forces rather than object-level legal arguments has
a certain appeal. It seems to provide a sense of what is really going
on—a deeper insight into Japanese politics. There is, after all, no
denying that political, policy and personal reasons played a large role
in Prime Minister Abe’s decision to pursue constitutional
amendment. From a foreign policy perspective, Japan’s principal
security ally, the United States, has long urged Japan to adopt a more
strident defense policy. In Japan’s case, that means normalizing her
defense policy and armed forces, 214 releasing American assets to
spend more energy on deployment elsewhere. 215 Arguably, a more
conventional defense policy would also enhance Japan’s broader
foreign policy influence. 216
In addition, the Reinterpretation is popular within the LDP,
particularly within the more hardline conservative factions. 217 Prime

The idea that broad democratic support is what makes Constitutional
change legitimate is a hallmark of the “Constitutional Moments” model discussed
at length in Part III, infra.
214
Seig & Takenaka, supra note 190 (“The United States, which defeated
Japan in World War Two then became its close ally with a security cooperation
treaty, welcomed the Japanese move and said it would make the U.S.-Japan alliance
more effective. ‘This decision is an important step for Japan as it seeks to make a
greater contribution to regional and global peace and security,’ Defense Secretary
Chuck Hagel said in a statement.”).
215 Id. (“Washington has long urged Tokyo to become a more equal alliance
partner and Japan’s move will also be welcomed by Southeast Asia nations that like
Tokyo have territorial rows with an increasingly assertive China.”)
216
This belief is, at any rate, widely—and probably correctly—attributed to
many members of the LDP. Id. (“Conservatives say the constitution’s warrenouncing Article 9 has limited Japan’s ability to defend itself and that a changing
regional power balance, including a rising China, means policies must be more
flexible.”).
217 Id. (“[Q]uoting Gerry Curtiss—’Conservative governments have pushed
the envelope hard and often to get the public to agree to a more elastic
interpretation of article 9 . . . ‘”)
213
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Minister Abe led a center-right faction within his Party. 218 To remain
in power he needed to be mindful of the further-right factions. 219
Prime Minister Abe could build political support with these factions
through the Reinterpretation, 220 so there were domestic political
reasons to pursue it, even if the Reinterpretation is not broadly
popular outside the Party. But, as many observers have noted, polling
and other public policy information shows that while the LDP may
strongly favor constitutional reform, the public largely does not. 221
Instead, the public is either unsure, or outright opposed, depending
on the poll. 222 Article 9 seems to be beloved by the Japanese public, 223
and attempts to revise it are viewed with great skepticism. 224
Because there is limited English-language writing on Japanese
internal politics, and because the Reinterpretation is a highly
controversial and sensitive topic within Japan, 225 it is easy for this
conventional narrative to take hold. It is also abundantly clear, from
218 List of Members, Seiwa POLITICAL-ANALYSIS COUNCIL [SEIWA SEISAKU
KENKYŪKAI], http://www.seiwaken.jp/seiwaken/seiwaken.html#03 (last visited
Aug. 18, 2020).
219 See generally Curtis, supra note 131.
220
Seig & Takenaka, supra note 190.
221 Id. (“Some voters worry about entanglement in foreign wars and others
are angry at what they see as a gutting of Article 9 by ignoring formal amendment
procedures.”).
222 See, e.g., Poll Shows 54% Oppose Revision of Japan’s Pacifist Constitution under
Abe’s Watch, JAPAN TIMES, supra note 212.
223
This fact is conceded even by those who seek to remove Article 9. See,
e.g., Akira Murao, Ishiba Attacks Abe for Shifting Stance on Constitutional Revision,
MAINICHI SHIMBUN (Sep. 7, 2018), https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20180907
/p2a/00m/0na/016000c016000c016000c7 (“At a meeting of Abe’s intraparty
faction in early August, a member argued that removing Article 9’s second
paragraph ‘may be logically consistent, but has little likelihood of getting support
from the opposition or the public, and this should be understood by a wider
audience inside the party.’”).
224 Id. (“[Removing Article 9] has little likelihood of getting support from
the opposition or the public. . . .”)
225
Martin, supra note 209 (“Most readers will recall that this
reinterpretation effort was highly controversial. The vast majority of constitutional
scholars in Japan, along with several former Supreme Court justices and former
directors of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau, publicly claimed that the
reinterpretation was illegitimate and unconstitutional, and tens of thousands of
people protested against it on in the streets.”).
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either a living constitution perspective, or from the perspective of
original public meaning, that this kind of political workaround is
improper. 226 It denies the people their fundamental right to amend
their government’s fundamental rules. The Constitution binds the
government. 227 The government should not be able to change it
without asking the people. 228
This conventional narrative misunderstands the importance
of the substantive legal questions at the center of the
Reinterpretation. Because the Reinterpretation is fundamentally an
effort to answer a genuine legal question, 229 it deserves to be analyzed
for its object-level legal merit. It addresses real, unsolved questions of
constitutional interpretation. If the Reinterpretation answers these
questions correctly—if it is right on the law—then it is as an exercise
of constitutional fidelity, regardless of whatever other political factors
might motivate the interpreters.
C. Legal Analysis
The problem with this narrative is not just that it places too
small an emphasis on the legal dialogue; it is that it misunderstands its
relevance. The law is not politics. 230 It may be shaped by political
forces, but it does not reduce to those forces. If the Reinterpretation
advances a view of the Constitution that is legally correct, then it

See generally Ackerman, supra note 28; ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 40 (1997) (“It certainly cannot
be said that a constitution naturally suggests changeability; to the contrary, its whole
purpose is to prevent change.”).
227 See RANDY BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE
PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY (2013).
228
Indeed, the ability of the chief executive to act beyond the authority of
the Constitution is a component factor in the ranking of the political freedom
within a country by the widely cited Freedom House Index. See Freedom of the World
2019, FREEDOM HOUSE, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/
freedom-world-2019/democracy-in-retreat (last visited Feb. 16, 2020).
229
REPORT OF THE ADVISORY PANEL, supra note 21, at 1, 4–8.
230
See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 208–217 (1962) (distinguishing between
political and legal questions).
226
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does not really matter (at least not legally) whether that view is
popular. 231
As mentioned briefly in Part I, there is a fundamental legal
problem at the heart of Article 9 created by Japan’s treaty obligations
under international law. Conspiratorial accounts miss this critical
point and therefore misunderstand the fundamental disagreement at
the heart of the Reinterpretation. The Constitution was ratified in
1946 232 and was, at that time, in a certain sense, the highest law of the
land. Yet in 1946 Japan was still under occupation. 233 Japan had
surrendered unconditionally to the United States 234 and the United
States followed international law and norms in carrying out that
occupation. 235 Indeed, the occupation is now largely viewed rather
positively in Japan. 236
Could the United States have ordered changes to Japan’s
1946 Constitution? Or even vetoed it entirely? This is a difficult
question. On the one hand, the Constitution is Japan’s highest law.
On the other hand, an unconditional surrender is a surrender of
sovereignty; the recognition that a state is no longer the sole master
of its affairs. 237
1. A Belligerent Hypothetical
Suppose that two states, A and B, go to war. To simplify the
hypothetical, assume that they fight the war above-board—they
See W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943) (“The very
purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of
political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials,
and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts.”).
232 See NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION] (Japan).
233 See generally DOWER, supra note 37.
234 Id.
235
We need not arbitrate the legal dispute over whether compliance with
international law is required for legal authority after an unconditional surrender. A
fortiori, even if it is, the United States seems to have been operating within these
constraints. See generally id.
236 Id. at 65.
237
Francis C. Balling, Unconditional Surrender and a Unilateral Declaration of
Peace, 39 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 474 (1945).
231
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declare in advance and they both commit no war crimes. 238
Eventually, B elects to conditionally surrender. A condition of the
surrender is that B amend its Constitution to permit the payment of
reparations to A for damages in the war equal to the harm B caused
A, as determined by A or by a neutral third party. Suppose for the
purposes of this example, that B’s original constitution explicitly
made reparations payments of this kind illegal. The Instrument of
Surrender and Treaty of Peace name A as the legal occupying power
of B until such changes are made.
Subsequent to the signature of this Instrument of Surrender,
B amends its Constitution to permit the payment of reparations as
determined solely by B to be reasonable and sufficient. A rejects this
amendment and orders B to draw up a new constitution, Draft 3. B
refuses to do so.
Who is in the right here legally? We have no idea. 239 A strong
argument can be made for a kind of transnational law
contractarianism, in which B has a duty to effect the changes in the
Instrument of Surrender and, if B breaches that duty, A can demand
specific performance. 240 After all, since the decision by B seems
fundamentally inequitable, specific performance seems reasonable. 241
On the other hand, it seems like B has a fundamental right to set its
basic law. And if that law is the Constitution, it seems wrong to place
another law above it. As Professor James Stern declared “we have no
concept of what it would mean for the Constitution to be
These conditions are added to avoid complexity caused by the War
itself being unlawfully launched or conducted. For simplicity, the author assumes
neither country is a signatory to the UN Charter or any other document that flatly
forbids the use of offensive war. We want a good clean hypo.
239
Even just by analogy to the United States, the answer is complex. Surely
in the American context the Constitution is the highest law and should presumably
trump any international obligations. Yet some international obligations may be so
central that, some argue, they must always bind, nevertheless. See generally Richard
Lillich, The United States Constitution and International Human Rights Law, 3 HARV.
HUM. RTS. J. 53 (1990).
240
A strong presentation of this argument is found in Makoto Iokibe, 50
Years of Japanese Diplomacy, 500 INT’L ISSUES 4 (2001) [Japanese language].
241
For this general approach to contract remedy, see CHARLES FRIED,
CONTRACT AS PROMISE (1981).
238
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unconstitutional.” 242 But is there a way for the Constitution to be
unlawful?
This is more than just an interesting theoretical question —
these are precisely the factual circumstances of Japan’s JSDF. Indeed,
the conflict between GHQs instructions and Article 9 is a complex
legal issue that Japanese legal scholars have struggled to answer. Their
debates have produced a range of views.
2. Contours of the Legal Landscape
One approach, which we call Absolute Constitutionalism,
maintains that the Constitution of 1946 is simply Japan’s highest
law. 243 Under this approach, any state action in conflict with that law
is unconstitutional. 244 Therefore, Japan’s 1950 enabling legislation
would have no legal force, despite GHQ’s orders. On this account,
the modern JSDF is either unconstitutional (because it is prohibited
by Article 9), or permitted (because Article 9, properly interpreted,
allows it). And if the JSDF is unconstitutional, then it always has
been ever since it was created. 245
Another approach, which we call Limited Constitutionalism,
holds that the order by GHQ did override the Constitution of 1946—
242
Interview with James Stern, Professor of Law, William and Mary Law
School, in Annapolis, MD (Aug. 10, 2019).
243
NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 98, para. 1
(Japan) (“This Constitution shall be the supreme law of the nation and no law,
ordinance, imperial rescript or other act of government, or part thereof, contrary to
the provisions hereof, shall have legal force or validity”).
244 See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (noting that “Article VI of the
Constituion makes the Constitution the ‘supreme Law of the Land”). See also
Norikazu Kawagishi, The Birth of Judicial Review in Japan, 5 INT’L J. CONST. L. 308
(2007).
245
Rui Abiru, Almost All Japanese Look Favorably at the JSDF, So Why Do We
Keep the Forces in Limbo?, JAPAN FORWARD (Mar. 13, 2018), https://japanforward.com/almost-all-japanese-look-favorably-at-the-jsdf-so-why-do-we-keepthe-forces-in-limbo/ (“[D]espite the government having always interpreted the
JSDF as constitutional, it would politically be irresponsible not to try to counter the
view of more than 60% of constitutional scholars that the JSDF is unconstitutional.
The Communist[sic] Party, too, according to chairman Kazuo Shii, is of the view
that, ‘the JSDF is incompatible with the Article 9 of the Constitution.’”).
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but only until Japan regained full sovereignty. Once that occurred in
1952, the Constitution again became the highest law. The trouble
with this approach is that the Treaty of San Francisco, which restored
full sovereignty to Japan, contained explicit language requiring Japan
to recognize the lawfulness of commitments made during the
occupation. 246 If these commitments were the condition on which
Japan regained full sovereignty, Limited Constitutionalism must hold
that they were vacuous (or, rather implausibly, that Japan has never
regained full sovereignty). Regardless, on this account, as in Absolute
Constitutionalism, the constitutionality of the present-day JSDF
depends entirely on the interpretation of Article 9.
A third approach, which we call Sovereign Contractarianism,
maintains that the orders of GHQ and the 1950 enabling legislation
were completely legally binding at the time and, per the Treaty of San
Francisco of 1952, remain completely legally binding. On this view,
the JSDF is lawful and legitimate because, while it may or may not
violate Article 9, the Japanese Constitution is not the highest relevant
legal authority—treaty agreements enacted at the conclusion of the
unconditional surrender are supreme and trump the 1946
Constitution.
A fourth and final approach, which we call Legal
Internationalism, simply holds that all international legal treaties of
Japan trump the 1946 Constitution. The idea here is that if Japan
enters into a legally binding international agreement that conflicts
with a provision of the Constitution, so much the worse for the
Constitution. On this account, the JSDF is perfectly legitimate
because it is required by the Treaty of San Francisco. International
law is simply higher than national law. 247
246
Treaty of Peace with Japan, supra note 16, at art. 19(d) (“Japan
recognizes the validity of all acts and omissions done during the period of
occupation under or in consequence of directives of the occupation authorities or
authorized by Japanese law at that time, and will take no action subjecting Allied
nationals to civil or criminal liability arising out of such acts or omissions.”).
247
To prove our thesis in this paper—that the Reinterpretation debate
turns on genuine legal issues—we do not need to arbitrate between these four
views or prove that any one of them is true. All we must show is that these four
views are actually held, actually plausible, and that the 2014 Reinterpretation is
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Defenders of the purely pragmatic narrative outlined in
Section 2 seem to implicitly assume that only Absolute
Constitutionalism or Limited Constitutionalism is plausible. In other
words, they assume that perhaps Japan was obligated to follow
GHQ’s enabling instructions in 1952—but it certainly is not now.
Coupled with the dubious assumption that there really is no legal
dispute about the meaning of Article 9, it follows that there is
nothing (legally) to fight about.
However, careful legal analysis does not unambiguously
support these assumptions. Japanese scholars and legal policymakers
take seriously the continuing authority of the Treaty of San
Francisco. 248 In that treaty, Japan made a number of legally binding
promises, among them that Japan would continue to be bound by
lawful orders issued by the occupying powers. 249 In other words, by
signing the Treaty of San Francisco, Japan explicitly affirmed the
authority of many prior policies—including lawful commands by the
allied Supreme Commander, General MacArthur. Japan therefore
affirmed General MacArthur’s order creating the Self-Defense Forces
through its Treaty commitments. This was not an idle promise; it was
a fundamental condition of regaining sovereignty. z
3.

Further Contours

The Cabinet convened its reinterpretation panel principally
because it was unsure of the legal status of Japan’s present security
situation. 250 The panel heard testimony from legal experts, seeking to
answer two questions: (i) had Article 9 of the Constitution been
interpreted previously to forbid collective self-defense; and (ii) was

about determining which one of them is accurate. This is sufficient to show that a
genuine legal dispute exists.
248
REPORT OF THE ADVISORY PANEL, supra note 21, at 4–8.
249
Treaty of Peace with Japan, supra note 16 at art. 19(d) (“Japan
recognizes the validity of all acts and omissions done during the period of
occupation under or in consequence of directives of the occupation authorities or
authorized by Japanese law at that time, and will take no action subjecting Allied
nationals to civil or criminal liability arising out of such acts or omissions.”).
250
REPORT OF THE ADVISORY PANEL, supra note 21, at 3.
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collective self-defense a form of self-defense under international
law? 251
The panel first answered question (i), concluding that Article
9 had not been interpreted to forbid collective self-defense. Although
there is little legal precedent, the panel did carefully consider
Sakata, 252 determining that it did not forbid collective self-defense. 253
Next, the panel answered question (ii), concluding that
international law views collective self-defense as a form of selfdefense. 254 The panel drew heavily on the U.N. Charter, which
explicitly reserves collective self-defense as a sovereign right (while at
the same time forbidding other forms of military action). 255
Based on this analysis, Article 9 can be interpreted in three

ways:

(1)
Restricting only aggressive forms of military
action; permitting self-defense and collective selfdefense. 256
(2)
Limiting Japan solely to pure self-defense; no
collective self-defense. 257
(3)
Forbidding any military forces of any kind,
including the JSDF. 258
Id. at 2.
Sakata v. Japan, 13 Keishu 3225 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Dec. 16, 1959).
253 Id.; REPORT OF THE ADVISORY PANEL, supra note 21, at 5.
254
REPORT OF THE ADVISORY PANEL, supra note 21, at 32.
255
U. N. Charter art. 51 (“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the
inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs
against a Member of the United Nations”); U. N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4 (“All Members
shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against
the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”).
256
This is the position taken by the Reinterpretation. See REPORT OF THE
ADVISORY PANEL, supra note 21.
257
This is one of the more common positions taken by opponents of the
Reinterpretation, including the CDP, Japan’s largest opposition bloc in Parliament.
See Norio, supra note 142.
251
252
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Each of these views can be combined with the four views
outlined above: (a) Absolute Constitutionalism, (b) Limited
Constitutionalism, (c) Sovereign Contractarianism, (d) Legal
Internationalism.
There are, in other words, twelve possible legal views here.
According to one set of views—1(a), 1(b)—the Constitution is
supreme, but permits collective self-defense. Accordingly, the JSDF
can engage in collective self-defense as long as Parliament wishes. But
there is no obligation—nor even any obligation to maintain the
JSDF.
According to the largest second set of six views—1(c), 1(d),
2(c), 2(d), 3(c), 3(d)—Japan must maintain a reserve force of at least
75,000 persons pursuant to G.O. 260, incorporated into the Treaty of
San Francisco. Therefore, both the JSDF and collective self-defense
are lawful and legitimate. The constitutional questions are not
relevant, because treaty law trumps.
Although these eight views differ, all conclude that the JSDF
and collective self-defense are both lawful and legitimate.
Following a third set of views—2(a), 2(b)—the JSDF is
lawful and legitimate but collective self-defense is forbidden by the
Constitution.
Finally, a fourth set of views—3(a), 3(b)—concludes that the
JSDF is flatly unconstitutional and (presumably) should legally be
disbanded. On this account, Sakata was wrongly decided. The
Constitution forbids any armed forces whatsoever, and, obviously,
forbids collective self-defense as well.
The conventional English-language narrative seems to
assume that only the third and fourth sets of views are legally
plausible. But these views represent just a third of the real estate in
the constitutional landscape. The assumption that only these views

258
Presumably, advocates of this position argue that Sakata was wrongly
decided. See, e.g., Panton, supra note 210.
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are plausible seems dubious, and little is advanced in the Englishlanguage literature to defend it. 259
Many of these views, require a careful scholarly analysis of
applicable treaties. Accordingly, reinterpretation by an expert panel is
perfectly sensible—and since an advisory opinion is not possible
under Japanese law, probably the best way that the Prime Minister
can try to be faithful to the law. 260
This analysis does not all justify the most radical of Englishlanguage commentators, who assert not only that the Panel’s position
is incorrect, but that the Prime Minister and his advisors know that it
is incorrect and are pretending otherwise as part of a plot to deceive
the electorate. 261 This conclusion is simply not supported by the facts
in evidence.
4. A Noncommittal Defense of the Reinterpretation
To emphasize the legal plausibility of the Cabinet’s position,
we here present a sketch of an argument in favor of collective selfdefense. Our goal here is not to show that this argument is correct,
but rather merely that it is a plausible good-faith legal stance. An
argument to this effect might proceed as follows:
The Supreme Court, in its most significant decision on the
matter, determined that Article 9 does not forbid the maintenance of
some security forces and in any event was not intended to completely
foreswear self-defense. 262 As it is emphatically the duty of the

An exception is Martin, who does present arguments in defense of his
interpretative stance, although we disagree with his conclusions. See Martin, supra
note 27.
260 See generally Matsui Shigenori, supra note 46; see also Eric Rasmusen & J.
Mark Ramseyer, Why Are Japanese Judges So Conservative in Politically Charged Cases?, 95
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 331 (2001).
261 See, e.g., Panton, supra note 210.
262
Sakata v. Japan, 13 Keishu 3225 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Dec. 16, 1959) (“Thus,
[Article 9] renounces the so-called war and prohibits the maintenance of the socalled war potential, but certainly there is nothing in it which would deny the right
of self-defense inherent in our nation as a sovereign power.”).
259
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Japanese Supreme Court to say what Japanese law is, 263 this decision
implies that the Self-Defense Forces are, simply put, legal. Of course,
it is possible that the Court erred in its judgment, but even if the
Prime Minister felt this way, is he not bound to the law as currently
interpreted? 264
Plausibly Sakata’s approval of the JSDF could be understood
as conditioned upon the idea that the JSDF have a purely defensive
role. 265 But what of collective self-defense? If Japanese forces commit
to defending allies when they are engaged, does that broader
commitment contradict Article 9? And if so, does that make the new
role unconstitutional?
Because no case challenging collective self-defense had yet
arisen through the adversarial process, involving the judiciary would
mean asking for an advisory opinion. 266 Advisory opinions are not
permitted under Japanese law. 267 What then ought the Cabinet to do?
To get a final answer the government has to take a position,
presumably in consultation with its own legal counsel. 268 Once the
government has set a policy, it could then be challenged and that
challenge can be arbitrated by the Supreme Court. 269 The analogue to
NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 81 (Japan); see
also, e.g., Kurokawa v. Chiba Prefecture Election Comm’n, 30 Minsh 223, 248-50 (Sup. Ct.,
G.B., Apr. 14, 1976); Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 14, 1976, 30 SAIKO
SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHU [MINSHU] 223; cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
264
Kurokawa v. Chiba Prefecture Election Comm’n, 30 Minsh 223 (Sup. Ct.,
G.B., Apr. 14, 1976); cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803);
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683; Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
579 (1952).
265
Sakata v. Japan, 13 Keishu 3225 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Dec. 16, 1959).
266 Cf. Letter by John Jay, Chief Justice, United States, to George
Washington, President, United States (Aug. 8, 1793) (available at http://presspubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/a3_2_1s34.html).
267 See generally Masahito Tadano, The Role of the Judicial Branch in the Protection
of Fundamental Rights in Japan, in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN HUMAN RIGHTS
LAW (Yukimo Nakanishi ed., 2017); see also Rasmusen, supra note 260.
268 Id; see also Matsui Shigenori, supra note 46.
269
Critics of this argument would likely respond that the Japanese
Supreme Court is too passive to be entrusted with this role. See, e.g., David S. Law,
Why Has Judicial Review Failed in Japan?, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1425 (2011). Even if
263
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the American system would be to ask White House Counsel or the
Justice Department to submit an internal memorandum opining on
the correct interpretation of a constitutional restriction. 270 Nor are
there separation of powers concerns: if the Prime Minister comes to
an incorrect conclusion there is both a judicial remedy (the courts can
strike down the interpretation) and a political one (through the
election of a new Prime Minister).
Of course, this is precisely what the Prime Minister and the
Cabinet have done through the Reinterpretation. The Cabinet took a
complex question and submitted it for expert analysis. 271 The Cabinet
then adopted a working position they take to represent those expert’s
conclusions. If they have erred, the Supreme Court stands ready to
clarify. The Reinterpretation is not an attempt to go around the
Constitution — it is an attempt to work within it.
D. Conclusion
The 2014 Reinterpretation is often portrayed as an end-run
around the restrictions of Article 9. But the evidence does not
support this narrative. First, Article 9 has not been interpreted to
restrict collective self-defense. 272 Second, the Reinterpretation was
throughout squarely focused on legal questions. 273
Japan adopted Article 9 under unusual circumstances that
pose novel legal questions. Unique legal facts and history affected the
creation of the Self-Defense Forces. Path-dependence and the
specifics of past legal cases shaped a history of debates over
interpretation.
There are real legal questions at play here because the
documents that form the basis of the law are genuinely unclear. The
this criticism were sound, the error is the Supreme Courts. The Prime Minister
must follow the Constitution—if the Court is too lackadaisical in its approach that
does not change the PM’s lawful duties.
270
Tadano, supra note 267.
271
REPORT OF THE ADVISORY PANEL, supra note 21.
272
Sakata v. Japan, 13 Keishu 3225 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Dec. 16, 1959).
273
REPORT OF THE ADVISORY PANEL, supra note 21.
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Reinterpretation is an attempt to answer these thorny questions.
Similarly, a constitutional amendment would help further clarify the
status of the armed forces and their treatment under international law
by bringing the Constitution more clearly into harmony with
international obligations. Like the Restatements, or clarifying rules
promulgated by an agency after notice and comment, efforts to bring
harmony to confusing and conflicting laws have real merit. Like any
legal project, these efforts may fail. But that doesn’t make it a
conspiracy—just a work in progress.
III. IS THE REINTERPRETATION CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE?
The debate over the Reinterpretation reflects a common
trope in constitutional discourse: the other side is accused of not
merely misunderstanding the Constitution, but ignoring its meaning
entirely. 274 Rather, the other side is engaged, not in an act of
constitutional interpretation, but of “constitutional revision.” 275 This
line of attack views the opposing position as either so obviously
unsupported by the Constitution, or so openly based on extraconstitutional considerations, that it does not qualify even as an
attempt to faithfully interpret the meaning of the text. Instead, it is a
naked exercise of political power, brazenly ignoring the constitutional
constraints on that power. 276
As Part II of this Essay explains, this argument unreasonably
sidelines the serious legal justifications for the current Constitutional
Reinterpretation in Japan. The continuing authority of General
See, e.g., Letter from Donald J. Trump, President, United States, to
Nancy Pelosi, Speaker, United States House of Representatives (Dec. 17, 2019)
(“By proceeding with your invalid impeachment, you are violating your oaths of
office, you are breaking your allegiance to the Constitution, and you are declaring
open war on American democracy.”).
275
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2627 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(accusing the majority of revising, rather than interpreting, the Constitution, by
protecting the unenumerated right of same-sex couples to marry).
276 See e.g., id.; Ariz. State Legis. v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct.
2652, 2678 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (accusing the majority of “ignor[ing]”
the “text, structure, [and] history of the Constitution” in favor of “naked appeals to
public policy”).
274
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MacArthur’s order combined with the international treaty obligations
codified by the Treaty of San Francisco and other documents, raise
serious, real and open legal questions with regard to their supremacy
over the Post-War Constitution. While modern political and foreign
policy considerations surely motivated the Abe administration’s
stance on the necessity of collective self-defense, the Reinterpretation
is more than simply an attempt to address a political problem. It is
necessitated by the decades-long tension between Japan’s domestic
and international legal obligations, and between those obligations and
the country’s historical practice.
Because critics of the Reinterpretation take as a premise that
it is legally unfounded, they instead tend to analyze it as an attempt at
informal constitutional change. Several scholars, most notably
Professor Bruce Ackerman at Yale Law School, have proposed
mechanisms by which constitutions can be effectively amended
without going through a formal amendment process. 277 Indeed,
Professor Ackerman understands constitutional change as occurring
primarily through these informal mechanisms. Viewed through this
lens, the Reinterpretation is often seen as an illegitimate form of
constitutional change, lacking the necessary popular support to
qualify as an informal amendment. 278
The problem with this view, however, comes in the first
instance from its premise that the Reinterpretation is a form of
constitutional change. Rather than amending the Constitution, the
Reinterpretation contends that its current meaning supports an
expansion of Japanese military doctrine to encompass collective selfdefense. Ackerman’s theory of constitutional change rejects the
possibility that reinterpretation can restore the original understanding
of a constitutional provision. 279 But that is precisely what the
Reinterpretation seeks to do. Accordingly, the interpretation should
not be viewed as an attempt at an informal constitutional
amendment. Instead, it should be assessed on its own merits as a
legal interpretation of the constraints Article 9 actually imposes.
See Ackerman, supra note 28, at ch. 10.
See e.g., Dixon & Baldwin, supra note 26.
279 See Ackerman, supra note 28, at 835 (discussing the “myth of
rediscovery”).
277
278
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A. The Reinterpretation as Informal Constitutional Amendment
Non-Japanese scholars analyzing the Reinterpretation as a
form of constitutional change are often sharply critical. Professor
Craig Martin, for example, has argued that the Reinterpretation is a
transparent end-run around the Japanese Constitution’s formal
amendment process. 280 And Professors Rosalind Dixon and Guy
Baldwin have argued that a single-party system like Japan’s may lack
the necessary kind of democratic competition necessary to legitimize
informal constitutional amendments. 281 These analyses often employ
Professor Bruce Ackerman’s model of “constitutional
moments” 282—likely the leading model of constitutional change
outside of the formal amendment process, 283 and one that places
heavy emphasis on democratic approval of constitutional change. 284
Accordingly, scholarly criticism of the Reinterpretation has often
focused on its lack of democratic foundation. 285

Martin, supra note 27, at 508–11.
Dixon & Baldwin, supra note 26, at 158–72. This view of the triumph of
the LDP is controversial and, in our view, ignores the diversity of policy opinions
expressed within Japan’s factions. See, e.g., Matthew D. McCubbins & Michael F.
Thies, As a Matter of Factions: The Budgetary Implications of Shifting Factional Control in
Japan’s LDP, 22 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 293 (1997).
282 Id. at 148–52.
283 See id. at 148 (“Perhaps the best-known theory of informal
constitutional change in the United States . . . is Bruce Ackerman’s theory of
‘constitutional moments.’”) But see also David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of
Constitutional Amendments, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1457 (2001) (describing most
constitutional change as occurring outside the amendment process); Mark Tushnet,
Constitutional Change: Constitutional Workarounds, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1499, 1510 (2009)
(describing “constitutional workarounds”—i.e., governmental actions designed to
circumvent constitutional prohibitions by relying on alternate provisions of the
constitution—as “a method of amendment the Constitution without altering its
text, in the same family as judicial interpretation and ‘constitutional moments.’”).
284
See Daniel Taylor Young, How Do You Measure a Constitutional Moment?
Using Algorithmic Topic Modeling to Evaluate Bruce Ackerman’s Theory of Constitutional
Change, 122 YALE L.J. 1990, 2001 (2013) (“Ackerman insists that the mechanism
that legitimizes reformers’ claims to popular sovereignty is the expression of
political will manifested in these elections.”).
285 See Dixon & Baldwin, supra note 26, at 169–71; Martin, supra note 23, at
508 (“To begin with, I would suggest that the absence of any expression of popular
will in favor of the change, is a factor that counts against its legitimacy.”).
280
281
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Professor Ackerman himself, for example, has been a vocal
critic of the Reinterpretation for its apparent disregard of the
democratic process. 286 In one article, Ackerman briefly asserts that
the Abe administration’s interpretation of Article 9 is “illegal,” before
quickly proceeding to exhaustively list the ways in which Prime
Minister Abe failed (or did not try) to gather popular approval for the
Reinterpretation. 287 For example, Abe is accused of failing to gather
the legislative support to initiate a referendum to amend Article 9;
failing to enact a constitutional amendment that would have made a
referendum easier to pass; failing to push military legislation through
parliament; and failing to make his case to the public, a majority of
whom continued to believe the Prime Minister’s initiative was
unconstitutional. 288 Ackerman argues that, instead of going through a
democratic process, Prime Minister Abe achieved his policy goals
through an administrative process, “pressur[ing]” the government
into adopting an understanding of Article 9 that would permit a more
expansive use of military force. 289
On their face, these criticisms would seem to have minimal
legal relevance. If the Reinterpretation’s understanding of Article 9
were correct, an end-run around the Constitution’s formal
amendment process would be unnecessary. The Constitution would
not need to be amended, because it would already say what the
administration asserted that it said. Additionally, public support
would be irrelevant, at least with respect to the meaning of the text,
because regardless, the law would be on the administration’s side.
Alternatively, if the Reinterpretation’s understanding of the
Constitution were incorrect, the above measures would be
insufficient to remedy the legal error. Neither public support, nor
ordinary legislation, can overcome a clear constitutional command. A
Constitution’s guarantees “may not be submitted to vote; they
depend on the outcome of no elections.” 290 If the Constitution does

Bruce Ackerman & Tokujin Matsudaira, Cry ‘Havoc’ and Let Slip the
Constitution of War, FOREIGN POLICY (Sept. 28, 2015, 8:00 AM).
287 Id.
288 Id.
289 Id.
290
W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
286
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not mean what the Prime Minister thinks, the only way to ratify his
interpretation is through amendment.
But, for Professor Ackerman, these democratic
considerations have legal significance as well. 291 Ackerman has
advanced an understanding of constitutional changes that depends
relatively little on textual formality. 292 Instead, constitutional change
occurs through a series of “constitutional moments”—outpourings
of popular support that disrupt traditional practice and establish a
new set of constitutional norms. 293 Under this model of
constitutional change, the concern with the Reinterpretation has less
to do with its alleged lack of formal legal justification. Instead, the
problem is that it changes the country’s constitutional understanding
without the necessary super-majoritarian support. 294
Professor Ackerman conceives of constitutional change as
occurring through a series of “constitutional moments.” 295 These
moments generally involve multiple branches of government, as well
as the people themselves. 296 They need not, however, involve a
formal
constitutional
amendment. 297
Instead,
substantive
constitutional change occurs when effectively ratified by the general
public, usually in an election where the relevant change is a
particularly salient issue. 298 From this perspective, constitutional
norms do not live in the constitutional text, or even in the history or

291 See Bruce Ackerman, The Holmes Lectures: The Living Constitution, 120
HARV. L. REV. 1737, 1751 (2007) (suggesting that a rigorous understanding of
formal constitutional change can give rise to an “official constitutional canon that is
adequate for use by lawyers and judges.”).
292 See Young, supra note 284, at 1997–98.
293 Id. at 1998.
294 See, e.g., Martin, supra note 27, at 447.
295
Ackerman, supra note 291, a 1763. See also id. at 1757–92.
296 Id. at 1777–1785 (describing how national elections, the judiciary,
Congress, and the President all participated in bringing about the constitutional
changes that defined the civil rights era).
297 See id.; Young, supra note 284, at 1997–98.
298
Young, supra note 284, at 2004 (“Ackerman attributes enormous
significance to the supposedly heightened salience of constitutional issues during
the elections.”).
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intent behind constitutional provisions. 299 Instead, these norms arise
from the evolving consensus of the general public as demonstrated
by a series of ratifying events. 300 Amendments therefore have little
role to play in the understanding of the constitutional change itself. 301
They primarily exist to codify and formalize law that has already been
put into practice. 302 The actual change in the law occurs through
extraconstitutional, and often political processes. 303
The ‘constitutional moments’ model of constitutional change
arises from the observation that a constitution’s implementation can
change dramatically, even without an amendment. 304 Ackerman
developed this model in the context of developments in American
constitutional law that occurred without a formal amendment
process. 305 The Supreme Court’s reinterpretation of the Interstate
Commerce Clause in the wake of the New Deal, for example,
significantly increased the federal government’s power to enact
economic legislation, even if that legislation touched primarily on
intrastate activities. 306 But the only amendment from that period
relevant to federal regulatory power—the 21st Amendment—limited
the federal government’s ability to regulate the sale and production of
alcohol. 307 Similarly, the reinterpretation of various constitutional
provisions to prohibit state-sanctioned racial discrimination, and to
allow Congress to prohibit private racial discrimination, occurred
See Ackerman, supra note 291, at 1750–51.
Id.
301 Id.
302 See Strauss, supra note 283, at 1459 (“[When] amendments are adopted,
they often do no more than ratify changes that have already taken place in society
without the help of an amendment.”).
303
Ackerman, supra note 291, at 1748.
304 Id. at 1750 (“[E]very American intuitively recognizes that the modern
amendments tell a very, very small part of the big constitutional story of the
twentieth century.”).
305 Id. at 1750–51.
306 Compare Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (holding that the
power to regulate interstate commerce does not extend to the power to prohibit
the interstate sale of goods made by child labor) and United States v. Darby Lumber
Co., 312 U.S. 100, 115–16 (1941) (overruling Hammer) with Wickard v. Fillburn, 317
U.S. 11 (1942) (permitting regulation under the Commerce Clause to reach even
the entirely intrastate production and consumption of wheat).
307
U.S. Const. amend. XXI.
299
300
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through a series of Supreme Court decisions and legislative acts. 308
Constitutional amendments have little if anything to do with this
change. 309
Nor, according to Ackerman, does the Constitution’s original
meaning. Many originalist constitutional scholars have argued that the
Supreme Court’s New Deal and desegregation decisions helped to
align the Court’s doctrine with the original meaning of the
Constitution. 310 From this perspective, the Court’s decisions in these
areas did not cause constitutional change—they simply reversed a
departure from the Constitution’s original understanding. Ackerman,
however, rejects this notion, which he calls the “myth of
rediscovery.” 311 According to Ackerman, the originalist narrative both
overstates the similarity between the modern era and the founding
era, and understates the transformational nature of modern
constitutional change. 312 Ackerman instead argues that modern
constitutional change diverges from the founders’ vision both
substantively
and
procedurally. 313
Substantively,
modern
308 See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (prohibiting school
segregation); Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241.
309
Arguably, the 24th Amendment (prohibiting poll taxes in federal
elections) was targeted at a discriminatory practice designed to disenfranchise black
voters; but the Supreme Court at the time understood poll taxes as an issue of
wealth discrimination rather than racial discrimination. See Harper v. Va. Bd. of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966). (invalidating a poll tax because “[v]oter
qualifications have no relation to wealth”). Additionally, the 24th Amendment
addressed only a minute portion of overall system of segregation. The integration
of schools, workplaces, and public accommodations, as well as the enfranchisement
of black voters in the South took place almost entirely through judicial and
legislative acts, not amendments. See, e.g., Brown, 347 U.S. at 483; Civil Rights Act of
1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241; Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89110, 79 Stat. 437.
310 See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY
107 (2005) (advocating a broad reading of the commerce clause according to its
original meaning); Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 35–38 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring
in the judgment) (defending the Supreme Court’s post-New Deal commerce clause
precedents); ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 83 (1990) (defending
Brown v. Board of Education on originalist grounds).
311
ACKERMAN, supra note 28, at 835.
312 Id.
313 Id.
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constitutional doctrine reflects principles and results in applications
that Ackerman believes the founders would not have envisioned.
And procedurally, modern constitutional change takes place outside
of the state-centric amendment process laid out in Article V of the
U.S. Constitution. Instead, change occurs through the development
of a national consensus, mediated through national institutions. 314
To provide scholars and judges with a test through which
they can identify legitimate (but informal) constitutional change,
Ackerman breaks the process into roughly five steps. 315 First, in the
signaling step, an institutional actor signals that constitutional change
could soon occur. Second, in the proposing step, the actor lays out its
specific plan for constitutional reform. Third, in the triggering step, the
people express support for this plan, usually through an election in
which constitutional issues are particularly salient. Fourth, in the
ratifying step, the people confirm their commitment to the
constitutional change. And finally, in the consolidating step, the
previous understanding of the Constitution is sidelined, and any
resistance to it fades away. If these steps have been followed,
Ackerman argues that we should grant the resulting change at least as
much legitimacy as we would a formal constitutional amendment. 316
B. The Reinterpretation is Not a Constitutional Moment
If one thinks that, for informal constitutional change to have
democratic legitimacy, it must occur within the context of a
constitutional moment, then the Reinterpretation may appear to be a
failed attempt to force a constitutional moment. 317 Although the LDP
may have attempted to signal and propose constitutional change, the
argument goes, they never garnered the popular support necessary to
properly legitimize it. 318 We argue, however, that Ackerman’s model
of constitutional moments is a poor fit by which to understand the
Reinterpretation. Ackerman’s model seeks to explain changes in
See Ackerman, supra note 291, at 1754.
Id. at 1762. Dixon and Baldwin also provide a helpful summary of this
process, supra note 26, at 149–51, as does Young, supra note 284, at 1999.
316
Ackerman, supra note 291, at 1754–56.
317 See Dixon & Baldwin, supra note 26.
318 Id. at 169–72.
314
315
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constitutional understanding that deviate from the Constitution’s
original meaning. But the Reinterpretation is an attempt to
implement, not change, the meaning of Article 9.
Professor Rosalind Dixon has argued that the
Reinterpretation is an attempt at informal constitutional change, but
an illegitimate one under Ackerman’s model of constitutional
moments. 319 Dixon explain thats, while “[s]uperficially, at least, there
is . . . evidence to support the existence of a constitutional ‘moment’
in the context of the Article 9 reform,” 320 Japan ultimately lacks
“sufficient political competition for a true constitutional moment.” 321
Dixon acknowledges that Prime Minister Abe may have “signaled”
his intention to adopt a policy of collective self-defense “as early as
2006.” 322 And the LDP released specific proposals for a planned
constitutional amendment in 2012. Accordingly, the “signaling” and
“proposing” components of a constitutional moment appear to be
present. However, according to the authors, these proposals never
resulted in a triggering election that demonstrated democratic
support for the change. 323 Abe’s proposed amendment was never
approved by the legislature. And although military legislation
ultimately was adopted, Dixon argues that the LDP was able to pass
legislation over popular protest because the party has had effectively
unchallenged rule since shortly after the adoption of the post-war
Constitution. 324 Ultimately, Dixon concludes that informal
Id.
Id. at 161.
321 Id. at 171.
322 Id. at 161.
323
The LDP’s landslide victory in the 2012 Japanese general election does
not apparently count, even though the LDP won an outright majority and, with its
long-time coalition partner, controlled a supermajority capable of overruling the
House of Councillors. Yuriko Nagano, Japanese Conservatives Win Landslide Election
Victory, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2012), https://www.latimes.com/world/la-xpm2012-dec-16-la-fg-wn-japan-conservatives-landslide-election-20121216-story.html.
Perhaps that is because even Prime Minister Abe acknowledged that the victory
mostly reflected disgust with opposition rule rather than roaring support for the
LDP. Yoshida Reiji, LDP Aware Voters Just Punished DPJ, JAPAN TIMES (Dec. 17,
2012),
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2012/12/17/national/ldp-awarevoters-just-punished-dpj/.
324 See Dixon & Baldwin, supra note 26, at 161–72.
319
320
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constitutional amendment may not be possible in a single-party
system, where the absence of real political competition deprives the
voting population of an effective channel by which they can express
their approval or disapproval for a proposed constitutional change. 325
Professor Craig Martin has argued even more forcefully that
the Reinterpretation cannot be understood as any legitimate form of
informal constitutional amendment. 326 Rejecting the notion that the
Reinterpretation proposes a legitimate or plausible reading of Article
9, 327 Martin criticizes the government for pressing forward with its
proposal despite the paucity of popular support. 328 Because Abe
cannot gather the necessary political support for a constitutional
amendment, Martin accuses the Abe administration of a “deliberate”
and “duplicitous” attempt to circumvent the formal amendment
process, 329 and suggests that even a formal amendment of the
Japanese Constitution would be unable to legitimately “dismember[]”
the Constitution’s “fundamental constitutional commitment to
pacificism.” 330
As discussed in Part II, such accusations of “duplicit[y]” are
unnecessary and unfounded. Even if the Abe administration might
have preferred a formal amendment to more persuasively pacify
critics, this does not imply that a formal amendment is required. If
the Prime Minister either believed that Article 9 could be read as
consistent with an exercise of collective self-defense, or that,
regardless, it is overridden by international law requirements to
maintain an active military force, then the parliament’s adoption of
military legislation, and the government’s adoption of a stance
Id. at 173. It is not necessary, for our thesis, to dispute this
characterization, since we do not view the Reinterpretation as a Constitutional
moment. Nevertheless, our view is that Dixon in this comment mischaracterizes
the real competition that exists in the Japanese political system, albeit mostly (at the
parliamentary level) between intra-party factions rather than between parties. Our
view here represents one side in a much larger debate. For a good general overview,
see Curtis, supra note 131.
326
Martin, supra note 27.
327 Id. at 489–502.
328 Id. at 506–08.
329 Id. at 508–10.
330 Id. at 512–13.
325
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consistent with the Reinterpretation, is precisely what an
administration should do in order to operate according to the law.
Indeed, Abe’s proposed legislation significantly pared back the
reform he had hoped to accomplish through constitutional
amendment. The 2012 Amendment—in contrast with the
Reinterpretation—expressly constitutionalizes the Self-Defense
Forces, giving them the legal status of a conventional national
military. There are real policy differences between these proposals.
For example, a preemptive strike against a military threat is flatly
inconsistent with the 2014 Reinterpretation, but arguably would be
permitted if the 2012 LDP Amendment were to have become law.
The Prime Minister’s restraint in declining to push for these broader
policy changes suggests that Prime Minister Abe does not intend the
Reinterpretation to circumvent the amendment process, but is
instead attempting to enact only policy already consistent with the
Constitution.
If the Supreme Court had invalidated the Reinterpretation
and Abe persisted in his stance, then Martin’s accusations would have
more force. But Martin concedes that the Supreme Court is unlikely
to issue a substantive ruling on the issue, and that if it does, that
ruling may be highly deferential to the government. 331 This point
undermines Martin’s accusation of illegitimacy, demonstrating that
the Reinterpretation’s position is consistent with existing doctrine (if
not the Constitution itself). 332 Official judicial interpretations of
Article 9 have been relatively rare, and have clarified relatively little.
The government’s adoption of a specific interpretative stance is
therefore not a contravention of any established legal principle. 333
Moreover, since the Supreme Court ought to have a controversy
before it rules on a question, the Reinterpretation may be a necessary
prerequisite to the creation of such a ruling in the first instance.

Id. at 488–89.
Interview with Keisuke Suzuki, State Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Parliament of Japan, New York (Jan. 18, 2020). Members of Parliament seem
confident that Prime Minister Abe would follow a ruling of Japan’s Supreme Court,
even if he disagreed with it.
333
Hasegawa, supra note 129. Nor is it viewed as such.
331
332
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This absence of authoritative judicial precedent undermines
one of the fundamental premises of these arguments: that the
Reinterpretation is an attempt at constitutional change. In Ackerman’s
examples of informal constitutional amendment, the enacted change
always upends not only existing practice, but also a settled
constitutional understanding. The Civil Rights Era did not just end
the legislative practice of government-enforced segregation; it also
overturned an existing constitutional principle of “separate but
equal.” 334 The New Deal did not just change a legislative policy of
economic nonintervention; it also overturned existing constitutional
doctrine holding that the federal government had limited power to
engage in such broad economic reforms. 335 Indeed, Ackerman
stresses the pre-moment constitutional doctrine may have been
justified at the time, but the constitutional moment required a
reevaluation of the country’s constitutional understanding. 336
Constitutional moments therefore represent more than just the
clarification of unresolved legal questions. They represent historical
changes in constitutional law, justified by historical changes in
national life.
By contrast, Japanese institutional practice has never reflected
a consensus around the lawfulness of collective self-defense. Japanese
courts, for example, have never authoritatively held that Japanese
forces may not engage in collective self-defense. 337 And while many
(although not all) Japanese scholars may interpret Article 9
restrictively, this should not be conflated with settled law. Before the
Reinterpretation, the question of collective self-defense was simply
less strategically pressing. However, increasing military expenditure
by China, and corresponding increases in American requests for
Japanese military expenditure and activity, have placed unprecedented
pressure on Article 9’s constraints. 338 Rather than attempting to
overturn an existing doctrine, the Reinterpretation is a response to a
Brown v. Bd. of Ed. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 116, 124 (1941) (overturning
or limiting prior cases).
336 See ACKERMAN, supra note 28, at 1185–1261.
337 See generally Peter Durfee, The Article 9 Debate at a Glance, NIPPON.COM
(Aug. 10, 2016), https://www.nippon.com/ja/features/h00146/.
338
Takenaka, supra note 11.
334
335
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novel political situation that existing doctrine has never had the
opportunity to address.
Attempts to characterize the Reinterpretation as informal
constitutional change presume the primary issue in dispute: whether
the Abe administration’s understanding of Japan’s obligations under
Article 9, in light of the Treaty of San Francisco, is a reasonable and
legitimate legal stance.
C. The Reinterpretation as Constitutional Fidelity
Supporters of the Reinterpretation do not see it as an attempt
to informally amend the Japanese Constitution. 339 Rather than
revising the Constitution, the Reinterpretation sets out to solve a
specific legal question: what, precisely, does Article 9 prohibit, and
how do those prohibitions square with Japanese obligations under
the Treaty of San Francisco? 340 Professors Dixon and Martin assume
that Article 9 is inconsistent with Abe’s preferred military policy, and
therefore understand the Reinterpretation as an attempt to amend the
Constitution. But this assumption sets aside the primary point of
dispute. The Reinterpretation’s fundamental premise is that Article 9
does not prohibit the administration’s military policy. 341
If this premise is correct—or even if one merely grants that
the Abe administration is operating on the good faith belief that it
is—then the Reinterpretation should not be understood as an
attempt at constitutional change. From its own internal perspective, it
is not trying to change the Constitution, but rather to more closely
adhere to it. Because the Reinterpretation is not an attempt at
constitutional revision, it does not need to derive its legitimacy from
an overwhelming groundswell of popular support, as the
constitutional moments model requires. Instead, if the legal
justifications for the Reinterpretation are correct, it derives its
legitimacy directly from Japan’s governing documents.

339
340
341

Interview with Nobukatsu Kanehara, supra note 9.
REPORT OF THE ADVISORY PANEL, supra note 21, at 25.
Id. at 25.
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It thus makes little sense to evaluate the Reinterpretation
under a constitutional framework that assumes that it is impossible to
rediscover a constitution’s original meaning. Instead, we suggest
analyzing the Reinterpretation from a documentarian perspective.
1. Documentarianism
Professor Akhil Amar has advanced a philosophy of
constitutional interpretation, which he calls “documetarianism”, 342
that emphasizes the truest interpretation of the Constitution over
subsequent doctrinal developments. Documentarianism recognizes
that constitutional change sometimes produces results inconsistent or
in tension with the actual meaning of the constitution; but it treats
such change as illegitimate. 343 From a documentarian perspective, the
job of constitutional actors is not necessarily to align their behavior
with public consensus (unless, of course, that consensus is expressed
through a properly ratified amendment), but to elaborate and clarify
the meaning of constitutional guarantees when a new situation arises
in which that meaning might not be clear. 344 If constitutional change
occurs outside of the formal amendment process, it should occur
only to make the implementation of constitutional norms more
faithful to the document itself. 345
The Civil Rights Era in the United States provides an
example that helps to illustrate the difference. Ackerman considers
the Civil Rights Era an important constitutional moment. 346
According to Ackerman, the era “radically transform[ed] the
Constitution as it was then understood.” 347 But for Amar, no kind of
“formal constitutional amendment or informal amendmentequivalent” was necessary to bring about this transformation. 348 From
Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme Court, 1999 Term-Foreword: The Document
and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26 (2000).
343
See id. at 78–84 (arguing that judicial doctrines conflicting with the
actual meaning of the Constitution should generally be rejected, notwithstanding
stare decisis).
344 Id. at 79–80.
345 Id. at 78–84.
346 See Ackerman, supra note 291, at 1762–785.
347 Id. at 1769 (emphasis added).
348
Amar, supra note 342, at 83.
342
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a documentarian perspective, the Civil Rights Era did not represent a
constitutional transformation so much as a constitutional
“restoration,” finally implementing the guarantees of the
Reconstruction Amendments that had been disregarded for nearly a
century before. 349 Documentarianism does not require an amendment
to restore the Constitution’s original meaning; just a “confession or
error” from those who have distorted it. 350
Documentarianism should not be conflated with originalism
or “pure textualism.” 351 Documentarianism points the constitutional
interpreter’s attention to what the constitution actually says; but it
does not require the interpreter to focus narrowly on only certain
kinds of textual evidence. 352 Constitutional meaning can be evaluated
according to the text of the constitution as originally understood, 353
or according to the original intention behind the constitution, 354 or
according to the purpose behind the provision in light of its
history, 355 or any combination of the above considerations. 356
Whatever the interpretative focus, however, the aim should be to
arrive at “the reading that best fits the entire document’s text,
enactment history, and general structure.” 357
Despite its focus on a largely static text, documentarianism
does not preclude a constitutional interpreter from considering
longstanding traditions or constitutional understandings. 358
Id.
Id.
351 Id. at 28.
352 Id. at 28–31.
353 See, e.g., SCALIA, supra note 226.
354 See,
e.g., ROBERT BORK, TRADITION AND MORALITY IN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1984).
355 See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, Our Democratic Constitution, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV.
245, 246–47 (2002) (advocating “an approach to constitutional interpretation that
places considerable weight upon consequences—consequences valued in terms of
basic constitutional purposes.”).
356 See Amar, supra note 342, at 31 (advocating interpretation derived from
the “text, history, and structure” of the Constitution).
357 Id. at 54.
358
Akhil Reed Amar, America’s Lived Constitution, 120 YALE L. J. 1734
(2011). [hereinafter Amar, America’s Lived Constitution].
349
350
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Occasionally, a Constitution may permit the interpreter to take such
factors into account. Additionally a Constitution can be interpreted in
a manner designed to accommodate existing practices. 359 A
documentarian interpretive approach can acknowledge that
constitutional text may be susceptible to multiple interpretations. 360
And when selecting between those interpretations, a documentarian
approach may prefer the construction that best accommodates
historical practice. 361 Such a choice not only reduces potential conflict
between different branches of government, but also respects each
branch’s ability to independently interpret the constitution.
2. Documentarian Analysis of the Reinterpretation
Arguments in favor of the Reinterpretation consistently
sound in documentarian terms. Consider some of the arguments
discussed in Part II. First, the text of Article 9 accommodates an
interpretation that is at least consistent with collective self-defense.
Though Article 9 renounces the maintenance of “land, sea, and air
forces,” this renunciation comes with a prefatory clause. 362 And this
clause (at least arguably) limits the Article’s scope only to the use of
military forces to wage wars of aggression. But documentarianism
considers more than just grammatical analysis. 363 Structural
arguments also bolster this reading—if Article 9 intended to
completely eliminate the maintenance of any military forces, then
Article 66’s requirement that government ministers be “civilians”
359 See, e.g., NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014) (acknowledging
the multiple potential interpretations of the recess appointments clause and
choosing the interpretation most consistent with the historical practice of
Presidents making appointments in recesses other than Congress’ primary summer
recess).
360 See Amar, supra note 342, at 79 (“But even after judges have derived as
much meaning as possible from the document, they will be faced with a broad
outline leaving a vast number of details unspecified.”).
361 See Amar, America’s Lived Constitution, supra note 358, at 1752 (“In
choosing between these two plausible readings . . . faithful interpreters should
embrace the [one] which helps the written Constitution cohere with settled
contemporary practice. . . .”).
362
NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION] art. 9, para. 2 (Japan).
363 See Amar, America’s Lived Constitution, supra note 342, at 28
(distinguishing documentarianism from “pure textualism”).
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would be redundant. These kinds of textual and intertextual
arguments are the bread and butter of documentarian
interpretation. 364
Or consider arguments looking outside the Constitution’s
four corners. Almost immediately after the post-war Constitution was
implemented, Japan was ordered to create national reserve forces.
And this order was issued by General MacArthur, the same person
who first called for the creation of a new Constitution for Japan.
Documentarian analysis often considers the way in which a provision
was interpreted shortly after its enactment. 365 And as early as the
1950s, Japan had adopted an interpretation of Article 9 that was
consistent with the maintenance of armed forces for self-defense, if
not collective self-defense. The Supreme Court’s decision in Sakata
confirms this interpretation. Sakata interpreted Article 9 to permit the
use of force in self-defense. And the decision deferred to the
government’s judgment about how to accomplish Japan’s defense
goals. Documentarian analysis places less emphasis on precedent
than other modes of constitutional interpretation. 366 But
documentarian arguments can nevertheless rely on precedent when
that precedent represents a permissible interpretation of the
Constitution. 367
Finally, consider the argument that Japan’s constitutional
obligations are inferior to its international ones. At first glance, such
an argument might seem anti-documentarian if anything, denigrating
the authority of the Constitution it is supposed to interpret. But not
every Constitution purports to be the “supreme Law of the Land.” 368
Indeed, Japan’s Constitution suggests just the opposite, affirming the
supremacy of Japan’s obligations under international law. The third
See generally AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN
CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY ch. 1 (2012)
[hereinafter Amar, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION].
365 Id. at ch. 8 (interpreting the U.S. Constitution by looking to the
Washington administration’s actions).
366
Amar, America’s Lived Constitution, supra note 342, at 83 (contrasting
documentarianism with Ackerman and Strauss’s “Maximalist Model of precedent”).
367
AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION, supra note 364, at ch.
4, ch. 5 (discussing the role of precedent).
368
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
364
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clause of the preamble declares “that no nation is responsible to itself
alone,” that “laws of political morality are universal; and that
obedience to such laws is incumbent upon all nations who would
sustain their own sovereignty and justify their sovereign relationship
with other nations.” 369 These affirmations justify the post-war
Constitution in light of the history of its enactment—another
essential tool of documentarian interpretation. 370 Though the
Constitution of Japan was ultimately ratified by both the Emperor
and the Diet, it was drafted at the order of the United States after
Japan’s unconditional surrender. A documentarian could therefore
appreciate that the Constitution of Japan derives its authority not just
from the people of Japan, but from Japan’s relationship with other
nations as well.
None of this is to say that this interpretation of Article 9 is
correct. But it is an interpretation. The Reinterpretation draws on
conventional tools of constitutional analysis, used to understand a
legal text, not to amend it. The legal underpinnings of the
Reinterpretation therefore do not depend upon an informal
amendment process. 371 Instead, the Reinterpretation contends that
Article 9 either permits Japan to engage in collective self-defense, or
that Article 9 is overridden by American instructions pursuant to the
Treaty of San Francisco. If this premise is correct, then the
documentarian argument is dispositive. The prevailing popular
understanding of the Constitution cannot be made subservient to
what Japan’s governing documents actually instruct. The adoption of
an interpretation that the government believes more faithfully reflects
the actual meaning of Article 9 should therefore not be characterized
as “informal constitutional change,” 372 but an attempt at
constitutional “restoration.” 373

NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION] pmbl. (Japan).
AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION, supra note 364, at ch. 2
(interpreting the U.S. Constitution by looking to the history behind its enactment).
371
Interview with Eiichi Hasegawa, supra note 129 (differentiating between
the changes sought through Reinterpretation and broader Amendment proposals).
372
Dixon & Baldwin, supra note 26, at 148.
373 See Amar, America’s Lived Constiution, supra note 342, at 83.
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CONCLUSION
Since the adoption of Japan’s post-war Constitution, Japanese
defense has operated in a legal gray zone: armed forces are arguably
required by Japan’s treaty obligations but are arguably forbidden by
Japan’s Constitution. Despite decades of subsequent legal debate, this
conflict has never been fully resolved, and whether Japan may
lawfully engage in collective self-defense remains an open question.
The Reinterpretation contends that Article 9 poses no barrier
to collective self-defense. This view is supported by serious legal
arguments about the actual meaning of the Article, and the scope of
its intended prohibitions. These arguments may be incorrect, and
Japan’s Supreme Court may ultimately so order. Until then, the
Reinterpretation should not be characterized as a rejection of law, but
an attempt to harmonize it. If Article 9 is too strict, then Japan must
either violate its obligations under the Treaty of San Francisco or
violate a provision of its Constitution. Depending on how the Court
rules, Japan may have to face that choice. For now, the
Reinterpretation avoids the conflict, and it does so on the basis of a
legal interpretation that seems, to us, manifestly reasonable.
Because the Reinterpretation addresses a live legal question, it
is not rightly viewed as an attempt at informal constitutional
amendment. If its legal premises are correct, the Reinterpretation is
not an amendment—it is simply the proper interpretation. Models of
informal constitutional change may provide an alternative
justification for the Reinterpretation—and if the legal foundation of
the Reinterpretation is rejected by the courts, then those models are
plausibly proper for determining the Reinterpretation’s legitimacy.
For now, though, the Reinterpretation presents a legal question,
resolvable by legal means. Until that question is resolved, it is no
more legally necessary to assess the political reaction to the
Reinterpretation than it is legally necessary to assess the political
response to any other legal argument.
Critics of the Reinterpretation need not worry that viewing
the issue through a legal lens concedes it. Domestic opponents of the
Reinterpretation have had no problem framing their argument in
66
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documentarian terms. While we believe that there are serious
arguments that Article 9 permits deference to the political branches
when they act for Japan’s self-defense, and that the supremacy of
international and treaty law in Japan remains an unsolved question,
we readily acknowledge that this view is not the consensus. Some
Japanese scholars have insisted that the Reinterpretation is
unconstitutional, arguments we take to be serious and made in good
faith. Our claim is simply that insufficient attention outside of Japan
has been dedicated to the substance of this legal, documentarian
debate—at least, relative to the focus on the Reinterpretation’s
political implications.
This may all be of limited political relevance to the ruling
administration’s intentions. The current Japanese government is
surely motivated less by academic legal arguments than by the grave
and growing threats of Chinese and North Korean military activity.
But political branches are supposed to be motivated by political
considerations. While their actions must have legal justification,
Japanese democracy provides a legal venue—the judiciary—through
which these justifications can be definitively tested.
A skeptic of the administration’s motives needs not give it the
benefit of the doubt—just the benefit of the law.
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